

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A long-term dimension to Weizsäcker's Moscow visit

Frankfurter Allgemeine

Bonn sees Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker's state visit to the Soviet Union as part of endeavours to ensure consistency in German-Soviet relations.

Neither the Federal government nor the head of state would like to see the visit rated a spectacular one-off move; they view it as a "link in a chain of efforts for exchange and cooperation."

To this target, outlined by the Federal President in Bonn, must be added the Federal government's hopes of the state visit playing its part in ensuring "continuity" and helping to make German-Soviet exchange ties something normal.

They would like to see Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze pay Bonn a return visit, then Chancellor Kohl confer with General Secretary Gorbachov.

Then there are expectations of "specific headway" in German-Soviet cooperation, possibly triggered by a wide range of talks. Bonn would like to avoid limiting the agenda to security matters.

Best of all, from Bonn's viewpoint, would be for a process of reciprocal give and take to emerge, including both economic and cultural affairs.


During the President's visit practical politics was handled mainly by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who conferred with Mr Shevardnadze and other Soviet leaders about the Geneva missile talks and the Reykjavik Nato formula by which a double zero solution on medium-range missiles must be followed by negotiations on a limitation of short-range missiles to equal ceilings — as part of striking a conventional balance and agreeing to a ban on chemical weapons.

Herr Genscher and Mr Shevardnadze signed a two-page final protocol on the bilateral agreement on scientific and technical cooperation enabling the 1986 framework treaty and three specialised agreements to come into force.

Herr Genscher and Research Minister Heinz Riesenhuber signed the treaty in Moscow last July; it serves as the framework for agreements on cooperation in health policy, agriculture and atomic energy.

In April and May Herr Riesenhuber, Health Minister Rita Süssmuth and Agriculture Minister Ignaz Kiechle and their Soviet counterparts signed the specialised agreements. The entire package can now take effect.

There has been talk in Bonn of a further agreement possibly being initialled in Moscow — or even signed by Environment Minister Klaus Töpfer as a member of the President's party. Negotiations on the bilateral environmental protection agreement reached in March the stage at which the text was ready for signing, but last-minute complications ruled out agreement in Moscow.



A Soviet attempt to include the representative of the Federal Environment Office, Berlin, separately (rather than in alphabetical order) in the annex to the agreement led to a standstill.

Bonn has no intention of allowing the impression to arise that it is preparted to accept treatment of Berlin as a special case — with an inevitable bearing on its political status.

In drafting the scientific and technical framework treaty a year ago it was agreed to list scientists concerned with treaty projects by name, followed by their employer (if a *Land* facility or a Federal government facility located in the Federal Republic).

Where Berlin staff of Federal government facilities were concerned their names were to be followed by Berlin post office box numbers and the location "Berlin (West)."

The post office boxes were to be applied for by their employers. Otherwise Berlin scientists were not mentioned separately — or differently — in the programme listings.

Moscow is now trying to adopt a different approach, but Bonn is not prepared to accept a separate mention of Berlin scientists at the end of the programme list and has tried to arrange talks with Moscow to clarify matters.

But with only days to go, clarification in time for the state visit was an unlikely prospect.

When Herr Genscher signed the scientific and technical framework agreement a year ago, mention was made in a special protocol note of negotiations on an environmental protection agreement and, in a roundabout way, of a representativwe of the Berlin Environment Office being included.

For the shipping agreement, on which negotiations are still in progress, and the inland waterways agreement, which is already initialled, and the opening of consulates-general in Kiev and Munich, agreed in principle last year, Bonn hopes the Moscow talks will help to clarify matters, even if agreement is not reached.

Bonn President Richard von Weizsäcker (left) with Soviet President Andrei Gromyko at the start of his state visit to the Soviet Union. (Cablephoto: dpa)

For the time being a legal assistance agreement and the two-yearly cultural exchange programme are also marking time.

The Federal President has nothing to do with such details. He does not conduct negotiations. His task was to discuss with Mr Gorbachov, with President Gromyko and with Mr Shevardnadze the long-term outlook for cooperation beyond the turn of the century.

Herr von Weizssäcker feels it will be particularly useful to concentrate on security and cooperation and on a reduction in weapons of all kinds, including conventional armament, to rule out risks.

That presupposes agreement on where threats exist and how to deal with them.

Cooperation must include the economy, science, the arts and, in particular, educational exchange.

Herr von Weizsäcker is convinced the success of Mr Gorbachov's attempts at restructuring would benefit the Soviet people and could be complemented, as a useful addition, by "external cooperation."

Cooperation, he argues, is no substitute for internal development of the Soviet Union, but it could help in the process.

He was keen to confer with Soviet economists and intellectuals, with young people and, in Moscow and Novosibirsk, with Soviet citizens of German extraction. Herr von Weizsäcker gave advance notice of his intention to pay special heed to the problems of ethnic Germans and their living conditions and travel facilities (including emigration).

On the eve of his visit to the Soviet Union he met in Bonn a Russian German who had been able to meet his mother in the Federal Republic for the first time in 45 years after appealing to Mr Gorbachov in person.

The Federal President also met representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and a German Lutheran church in the Soviet Union.

He was also keen to make contact with Soviet citizens "who devote themselves, their views and activities, to what we mean by human rights." It remained to be seen whether they included Alexei Sakharov.

He was anxious to visit Leningrad because the city, beleaguered for years during World War II, stood for what linked Germans and Russians, for better and for worse, in their history.

He was to visit Novosibirsk because he saw the Siberian section of the Soviet Academy of Science as a crystallisation point of a new scientific approach that had influenced a number of Mr Gorbachov's ideas.

Reconciliation, he feels, is a human process that cannot be on the agenda of a political visit. Memories of the war, and of acts of violence committed on both sides, had been forgotten in neither country.

"My visit serves the purposes of fostering relations in a comprehensive manner. We cannot close our eyes to the past, and that is anything but a torture: it is a means of helping us to solve problems, and maybe jointly."

By means of a "human form of remembrance and encounter" the foundations might be laid for future ties in the course of such visits.

Herr von Weizsäcker thus saw his state visit in the twofold context of politics and history.

Claus Gennrich

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 3 July 1987)

IN THIS ISSUE

■ EUROPE

No longer-term progress on CAP reform

Hannoversche Allgemeine

You would hardly think Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher had been at the same meeting in Brussels, so widely did their views vary on the outcome of the European summit.

The German Chancellor said it had been a success. The British Prime Minister implacably judged it to have been a failure.

It may sound a contradiction in terms, but both are right. No-one but German farmers can be wholly satisfied with the Brussels summit results.

They remain virtually unscathed. It was evidently worth their while to have waged war on Bonn, holding countrywide protest rallies and threatening politicians both with the pitchfork and at the ballot box.

The outcome of the European Council, to give the summit its official designation, has belied German Farmers Union officials' professional pessimism and prophecies of gloom.

Modest price cuts for cereals were inevitable given European Community silos full to overflowing. Yet after months of uncertainty German farmers now no longer need to fear serious earnings cuts.

The Brussels farm compromise guarantees that they will continue to suffer no disadvantage on any future occasion when a strong deutschemark is revalued.

Bonn Agriculture Minister Ignaz Kiechle, who had come in for harsh criticism, will be delighted. Once German farmers realise they were given preferential treatment in Brussels the Christian Democrats should have an easier time in forthcoming state assembly elections.

The German success in Brussels was mainly to the credit of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who was just in time in persuading his Cabinet colleagues to agree to a change of policy in Bonn.

It brought German policy on Europe out of the isolation into which Agriculture Minister Kiechle and Finance Minister Stoltenberg had manoeuvred it with the stubbornness and diplomatic skill of steamrollers.

At the end of the day it was not the Germans who were the villains of the piece, as had seemed likely a few days beforehand. It was Britain's Mrs Thatcher who was left out on a limb.

This reversal of roles was only possible because Franco-German cooperation functioned yet again.

In a summit tour de force the French and Germans reconciled their conflict of interests on Common Agricultural Policy. The others then toed the Bonn-Paris line.

This tactical feather in Herr Genscher's cap and Britain's isolation in the Twelve are not unproblematic for European integration, especially as Britain's self-assured Mrs Thatcher is far from wrong in her facts.

"You don't pour water into a bathtub before the plug is in position," she said, stubbornly refusing to agree to any increase in Community funds as long as CAP costs are not kept in check.

The costs of the common agricultural market will indeed continue to increase and be impossible, in the long term, to meet. European farmers will continue to produce unsaleable surpluses that go to wwaste at great expense in storage. European Community leaders failed again in Brussels to do anything effective about this CAP madness, which does the farmers no good (they net only a fraction of the cost) and European integration nothing but harm (with taxpayers unable to see the integration for butter mountains and cereal prairies).

The Community's finances are in an even gloomier state. The Brussels summit was unable to arrive at a solution on urgent budget issues. It failed to tackle the crucial task of finding a solution to the Community's increasingly serious financial crisis.

This year's budget deficit has skyrocketed to DM12bn and next year's increase in Community contributions as approved by Bonn will be nowhere near enough to close the gap.

The clash over this year's farm price review may have been settled and the Community's day-to-day problems provisionally solved. But Community heads of state and government have failed to take first steps in the direction of a fundamental farm and finance reform and give the Council of Ministers the lead in solving medium- and long-term problems.

Instead they have fussed over the pennies again and resorted to what nowadays is known as creative accountancy to cloud financial policy issues.

They have settled yet again for muddling through rather than for fundamental solutions to the Community's problems and for determined moves toward reform — to Europe's detriment.

Thomas Gack

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 2 July 1987)

German farmers angry over Brussels summit deal

European Community has agreed to a general price freeze for farm products and a cut in the price of cereals and vegetables. The Community's budget shortfall is to be met partly by changing the payments system to member countries from a month in advance to a month in arrears. German farmers are angry. The German Farmers Association (DBV) has withdrawn its invitation to Bonn Agriculture Minister Ignaz Kiechle to speak at the 1987 German Farmers Congress in Aachen.

In the long run the outcome of the European Community summit and the resolutions adopted by the Community's Agriculture Ministers are bound to cost Bonn's federal budget and West German taxpayers.

Bonn Agriculture Minister Ignaz Kiechle announced in Bonn that no additional funds would be needed for 1988, but hat much higher transfers to the Community would be necessary from 1989 onwards.

Kiechle informed the cabinet of the new situation during one-day consultations on the 1988 draft budget and fiscal policy planning up until 1991.

The consultations and commentaries on the Brussels resolutions and the 1988 federal budget were closely linked in Bonn.

Kiechle expressed his satisfaction at the Community's farm policy resolutions. The Bonn government, he claimed, had by and large stuck to its promises to German farmers.

The president of the Germans Farmers Association, Constantin Freiherr von Heereman, on the other hand, called the outcome disappointing.

During the meeting of the association's presidium in Aachen he complained that German farmers will face financial losses of roughly DM800m.

Via a policy of "brutal price pressure", said Heereman, the Commission of the European Communities was trying to push entire businesses and regions out of agriculture.

Kiechle emphasised that the value added tax regulation for the agricultural sector, which had been increased by five per cent, would be extended beyond 1988.

This provision, which *ensures farmers* compensation for losses resulting from Community resolutions, was originally planned to last until *the* end of 1988.

The annual losses of tax revenue are roughly DM1bn. Kiechle also pointed out that the decision not to introduce a tax on fatty substances and the possible introduction of a new Community financing system would necessitate higher transfers to Brussels from 1989 onwards.

The aim is to cover the *huge* deficit *in the* Community budget.

Kiechle stated that the Bonn government would in future have to transfer over DM8bn more to Brussels a year.

According to the new system the economic performance potential of individual Community member countries is to be included in the calculations of their respective contributions.

This means that, in addition to the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain, the *Netherlands and Denmark* would also have to pay more into the Community budget.

A third risk for Bonn federal finances lies in possible D-mark revaluations.

If resultant losses suffered by German farmers are offset via national funds, said Kiechle, this could represent an additional burden of several million marks to the federal budget.

Spokesmen for the coalition parties expressed their satisfaction at the Brussels resolutions.

Representatives of the SPD and the Greens, on the other hand, referred to a bad compromise.

Heinz Murmann

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 2 July 1987)

11-1 split over strategy for fighting prosperity disparities

People are about eight times better off in Hamburg than in southern Italy. People in southern Italy are better off than people in south-west Ireland. GNP per head is lower still in parts of Portugal.

This is the rule of thumb used by experts at the European Commission in Brussels to show that a financial adjustment is indispensable if the Twelve are to become a single internal market for goods, services, capital — and people.

In the wake of the Brussels European summit the Community has set its sights on the internal market.

Draft proposals are to be submitted to the next summit, or session of the European Council, to be held in Copenhagen in December (Denmark has just taken over from Belgium as chairman of the Council of Ministers).

Eleven of the Twelve (Britain was the odd man out) agreed in Brussels to supply data needed.

At the end of the year the Twelve hope to flesh out new financial arrangements for the European Community. They should show what structural safeguards are to be provided for setting up the internal market.

Connoisseurs of the European Community do not expect such sensitive decisions to be reached so soon, but the European Council should arrive at decisions by the end of June 1988 when the next European summit will be hosted by Chancellor Kohl in Hanover.

After ratification by the 12 national parliaments they could come into force at the beginning of 1989.

The enormous differences in prosperity between the 12 member-countries are the main reason for the new financial arrangements provisionally agreed in Brussels (with Britain the lone dissenter).

Economic common sense is insufficient as a motivation for the economic integration of the Twelve.

Economic and social, in other words political, stabilisation of the Mediterranean was a reason why Greece, Portugal and Spain were allowed to join.

In the internal market, planned for 1992, countries that are still in the throes of economic development will have to compete freely with longstanding industrialised nations north of the Alps.

How, in a mere five and a half years, can the tremendous economic gap that separates the Mediterranean countries and Ireland from the north be sufficiently bridged for them to be able to withstand open borders?

The more prosperous member-states will need to undertake a tour de force in their own interest (greater purchasing power in the southern member-countries means, for instance, greater scope for German exports).

So the European Commission has proposed, in a plan named after Commission president Jacques Delors, to double the size of the European structural fund.

Chancellor Kohl made it clear in Brussels he felt this increase was somewhat too generous, but he stressed more than once that Germany as the "largest exporter and foremost industrial power in the Community" was also its "greatest beneficiary."

Fifty-three per cent of the Federal Republic's exports now went to other European Community countries.

In both political and economic terms, as Bavarian Premier Franz Josef Strauss recently noted, a price will have to be paid for the internal market (just as one had been for the enlargement of the Community to include southern mem-

Continued on page 3

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■ HOME NEWS

Draft budget misses some targets

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG

The Bonn government's 1988 draft budget is unlikely to boost its reputation.

Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg has been forced to admit that his original policy goals have not been achieved.

In a study presented in 1985 on the tasks and objectives of a new fiscal policy and the limits to government borrowing Stoltenberg already indicated that fiscal policies can best contribute towards a lasting economic recovery by remaining convincing, insisting on a further reduction of public deficits, keeping the value of money stable, and thus creating the preconditions for continuingly low interest rates and tax relief.

In view of the fact that the government's nw borrowings already began increasing again in 1986 these preconditions would not appear to exist.

Whereas the increase in 1986 was only a few million marks this year's figure will probably amount to four DM4bn more than the target figure set by the Bundestag.

Stoltenberg can only avoid a supplementary budget because he can still fall back on credit authorisations from the past.

The budget proposal for 1988 sets forth new borrowings amounting to almost DM30bn, whereas the original target was DM20bn.

Finance Minister Stoltenberg, therefore, is doing all he can to emphasise the tight rein he keeps on spending.

As opposed to an average growth rate of 1.7 per cent between 1983 and 1987 the 2.4 per cent increase of the next federal budget is much higher, disproving any claims of austerity.

There will be a renewed increase in subsidies, and investments will fall in the medium term.

Both are trends in the wrong direction, even though there are plausible reasons in each case.

The commitment to raise the coaking coal equalisation grant (*Kokskohlebeihilfe*), which sets out to make up the difference between imported and domestic coal prices, and a reallocation of the investive and consumptive spending commitments between the federal government and the *Länder* are just two explanatory factors.

Among other things, however, the Bonn government has failed to stop the subsidisation of agriculture from becoming a bottomless pit.

It is not yet clear what demands will be made of the Finance Minister in future following the European Community's agricultural resolutions.

For the time being Stoltenberg dismisses demands for a national compensation if prices plummet in the wake of mark upvaluation by maintaining that currency adjustments are not to be expected.

However, in view of the probable increase in Bonn's contributions to the European Community Stoltenberg will have to make cuts in other fields next year as well as increase special consumer taxes, such as tobacco tax.

Medium-term fiscal policy planning, which envisages a decrease in new borrowings after 1991 following an increase up to just under DM31bn in 1990, seems extremely unrealistic.

Defence Minister Manfred Wörner has already announced a susbstantial increase in expenditures for new armament systems.

The coalition partners will decide on this in autumn.

A decision also has been taken by that time on West German participation in the expensive European space project.

Stoltenberg has earmarked a higher subsidy of the pensions insurance scheme, which was originally planned for 1990, for 1992, i.e. this item does not crop up in his medium-term planning up until 1991.

It is already clear that there will be no fiscal-policy room to manoeuvre with regard to new sociopolitical benefits, such as an extended upbringing allowance.

Coalition partners were hoping for this towards the middle of the parlimentary term.

Considerably reduced increases in the expected tax revenue as well as new expenditures are to blame. Both have eaten up reserves.

The major tax reform, which was planned as the reward for austerity, will now have to partly financed by loans.

Stoltenberg cannot be given all the blame for adverse developments in this field.

Nevertheless, his planning proposals are no longer as sound as they used to be.

The measures he now takes run contrary to his previous convictions.

This says very little about the success of his policy. Saving and limiting indebtedness is not an end in itself, but serves the prosperity of the economy as a whole.

At the moment the economy needs to be propped up, and if this can be done via tax relief and rising indebtedness this policy need not be criticised.

One main argument for not dropping its reform plans is that this is the only countercyclical policy tool the government intends employing.

The situation can only improve, however, if the positive effects outweigh the negative, and this is still uncertain.

Stoltenberg is not interested in taking any adventuresome fiscal policy risks.

Wolfgang Koch

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 3 July 1987)

Subsidy cuts needed if tax reform is to go through

The coalition has agreed on reforming the tax system in 1990. If this is to be achieved, subsidies need to be cut.

Politicians have often talked about cutting subsidies but little has happened. In 1983 Chancellor Kohl said in his policy statement a lasting economic recovery was linked to reduced subsidies.

Before him, Social Democrat Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said much the same thing. But these calls have remained mere lip-service.

It is true that there have been hesitant attempts to prune, but the amounts involved pale into insignificance in the face of additional farming subsidies.

In 1986 both Economic Minister Martin Bangemann and Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg said they wanted to cut subsidies. But their statements remain mere declarations of intent.

It is more than questionable whether the medium-term fiscal policy targets of reducing government subsidies by just under seven per cent before 1989 can be achieved.

In the meantime, the age-old concern of many Bonn governments, to clear up the jungle of subsidies, has assumed a new significance.

The coalition agreement on tax reform in 1990 means that mere lip-service is not enough. Without a drastic reduction of subsidies and other forms of fiscal aid this tax reform cannot be financed.

The only other alternative, which is much more convenient, is to increase value added tax — a decision which is hardly likely to be readily accepted by consumers. No-one in Bonn seems to know exactly where drastic cuts will be made.

The coalition would prefer to wait until *Land* elections are held in Bremen and Schleswig-Holstein in autumn before tackling this hot potato and perhaps scaring off potential voters.

The FDP is known to want a figure of DM19bn, whereas the CSU is keen on between DM5bn and DM6bn. The latter seems more realistic.

This should not discourage the FDP, however, from putting its list of subsidies on the negotiating table when the day of decision comes along.

pite an agreement to maintain silence on this matter some members of the coalition publicly aired their views before the Bundestag's summer recess.

Manfred Carstens, the CDU/CSU expert on budgetary affairs, for example, criticised expensive "business trips" and oriental carpets in bathrooms.

Although these are justified accusations they have very little to do with a comprehensive subsidy cutback. They would not represent a noticeable contribution towards the financing of tax reforms.

Other coalition politicians have warned against trying to achieve too much via subsidy cuts. If these cuts failed to achieve the desired results the failure could prove fatal in political terms.

It is hardly surprising that Baden-Württemberg Premier Lothar Späth has been so outspoken on this issue, since he would have to face the consequences of subsidy cutbacks in the middle of elections in his *Land*.

If the Bonn coalition government is really serious about its plans to reduce subsidies it will have cannot ignore major sectors.

These include agriculture, transport, housing, savings promotion measures and industry, mining, the energy sector or regional structural policies, not to mention the shipyards, the steel industry and aviation.

Saving alone is not enough. What is needed is a fundamental change of policy. The best example is farming.

Billions of marks could be saved if a direct compensation was paid to those farmers who actually suffer income losses rather than subsidising the whole sector as has been the case so far.

Both courage and a new concept are required to remove the mountain of subsidies. It is doubtful whether this can be down within just a few weeks.

Peter J. Velte

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 25 June 1987)

Continued from page 2

ber-countries). The Chancellor feels an important benchmark has been made now 11 of the 12 Community heads of government have agreed to the drafting of guidelines for financial reform.

Finance Ministers and the European Commission are bound by this summit directive.

The key feature of the reform proposals is the reorientation of member-countries' contributions to the Community budget called for by Commission president Delors ("We thank him for his work prior to and at this summit," Herr Kohl said).

At present the Twelve remit to Brussels 1.4 per cent of their value-added tax revenue, plus tariffs on imports and agricultural levies.

This system has the absurd result that prosperous countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Holland and Luxembourg are net beneficiaries of Community transfers.

The Delors Plan as expressly approved in principle by Bonn in Brussels proposes contributions based on member-countries' "relative prosperity" and "economic performance."

From 1989 the Community's present net paymasters, Britain, France and Germany, would be joined by the others mentioned above in making their contribution toward what Belgian Premier Wilfried Martens called the "community of European solidarity."

Mrs Thatcher rejected the Delors Plan for reassessing financial contributions and, in particular, for the structural fund from which poorer member-countries will benefit.

She did so even though Britain's contributions would probably be lower (although the British "rebate" would then no longer apply).

Is she simply refusing to pay the Community any more money, and what European policy concept (if the cap can still be said to fit) might her behaviour possibly be based on?

Observers in Brussels are wondering. Chancellor Kohl hopes Britain will waive its objection.

Otherwise views will differ in Copenhagen between those who want no more than free trade (assuming there to be others who share Mrs Thatcher's view but at present prefer not to say so) and those who favour a community of solidarity firmly based on integration.

Mrs Thatcher would hear of nothing but thrift at the Brussels summit, and the proposals went nowhere near far enough in this direction for her liking.

Inasmuch as the costs of common agricultural policy are curbed, European Community taxpayers will agree wholeheartedly.

But there must be more to a grand design than thrift, the other 11 Community leaders felt.

With substantial delay the Council of Agriculture Ministers agreed on farm support prices for 1987, Bonn and Paris having previously resolved their longstanding differences on the border offset levy.

In return German farmers will be given a further financial shot in the arm with express European Community approval — Britain included.

France met Germany more than halfway. The French, it is rumoured, feel Bonn might return the favour on, say, future-orientated joint technology projects.

Hermann Bohle

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 3 July 1987)

■ PEOPLE

Philosopher says answers are in Sermon on the Mount

Allgemeine Zeitung

In a surprising renunciation of the "powerless arguments" of reason the world-famous philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker has advocated a new religiousness.

Peace, he claims, is the "body of truth", and only the call for peace can save the world.

For over 30 years Weizsäcker, who celebrate his 75th birthday on 28 June, has addressed experts, politicians and the politically interested public at large with his books and speeches.

Publications such as *Die Verantwortung der Wissenschaft im Atomzeitalter* (The Responsibility of Science in the Nuclear Age), *Wege in Gefahr* (Paths in Danger), and *Der Garten des Menschlichen* (The Garden of Humanity) exerted a lasting influence on philosophical discussions.

Yet their impact remained limited.

As director of the Max Planck Institute for the Research of Living Conditions in the Scientific-Technical World and as Germany's best-informed peace researcher, Weizsäcker became noticeably more and more pessimistic.

He felt that a nuclear conflict was probable and viewed nuclear energy, which he once welcomed, as a misfortune.

Seven years ago, therefore, Weizsäcker withdrew from public life to give his undivided attention to his main scientific pursuit, the philosophical interpretation of the quantum theory.

This period of silent reflection, however, now appears to be over.

During the German Protestant Church assembly in Frankfurt the philosopher presented himself as a preacher.

Weizsäcker has not, like many philosophers before him, become pious in his old age, but simply more radical in his religious beliefs.

Whereas he once assumed that we act wrongly because we think wrongly Weizsäcker is now convinced that our cardinal error is our lack of faith.

He turns to Christians and calls for a "council for justice, peace and the conservation of creation".

Nothing is more wrong today, Weizsäcker emphasises, than the search for scapegoats.

The world is confronted by objective problems such as domination and bondage, war and the exploitation of nature, says Weizsäcker.

Although mankind has always been confronted by these problems, modern technology and its implications make them highly dangerous.

What we need, Weizsäcker insists, are answers, and Christians can find a clear message in the Sermon on the Mount.



Lack of faith is the problem, says von Weizsäcker. (Photo: Sven Simon)

Has Weizsäcker, who for many decades was the perfect example of a clever and level-headed person, suddenly become a "dreamer", as criticised by the Munich philosopher Robert Spaemann?

Or has Weizsäcker also turned to the "new religion" which this year's winner of the German book trade's peace prize, Hans Jonas, claimed is essential if we are to survive?

Weizsäcker was born in Kiel and comes from a well-known family.

His great-grandfather was a highly respected Protestant theologian, his grandfather a Minister-President in Württemberg, and his father a state secretary in the Foreign Office in Nazi Germany.

Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's brother Richard has been President of the Federal Republic of Germany since 1984.

Personally encouraged by Werner Heisenberg, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker studied mathematics and physics in Leipzig, Berlin and Göttingen and belinged to the circle of quantum physicists who had gathered around Niels Bohr.

In 1937 he developed the "Weizsäcker formula" for the energy content of atomic nuclei.

Weizsäcker worked together with Otto Hahn and was one of the scientists who tried in vain to construct a German atomic bomb.

He was never a supporter of the Nazis. The "glimpse behind the scenes" via his father's activities strengthened his rejection.

After the war Weizsäcker lectured as a professor of physics in Göttingen.

His main natural sciences publication, *Zum Weltbild der Physik* (On the Philosophy of Physics), was published in 1943 and supplemented by his book *Aufbau der Physik* (Structure of Physics) in 1985.

In 1957 Weizsäcker accepted the offer of a professorship of philosophy at the University of Hamburg.

His philosophical "guiding lights" were Plato, Kant and Heidegger.

In 1958 Weizsäcker was awarded the Goethe Prize of the city of Frankfurt and in 1963 the Peace Prize of the German book trade.

He first became involved in peace research when he initiated the "Declaration of the Göttigen Eighteen", in which prominent scientists came out against a nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr.

His interest in the translation of theories into practice became a decisive guiding principle of his career after 1970. It was in this year that he assumed

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Reconciliation alone not enough, says late envoy Burns. (Photo: ...)

Former American ambassador to Bonn dies

Former American ambassador to Bonn, Arthur F. Burns, has died at the age of 83. Many recall the warm-hearted man with the mop of silvery hair who was Washington's man in Bonn between 1981 and 1985.

In America he was an outstanding economist. He was adviser to many presidents and was the chairman of the council of governors of the central bank system.

Germans young and old will mourn a friend who fought to the very last to maintain links between Washington and Bonn.

At the inception of the Weisse R. Foundation in the Capitol Burns coined the phrase "loving reconciliation" in connection with relations between Jews and Germans. Love and reconciliation in isolation, he stressed, are not enough.

When Burns decided to go to Bonn in 1981 he realised that it could be a step towards greater reconciliation if he became ambassador in a country which had committed terrible crimes against his fellow Jews.

When he came relations with America were strained.

The Nato twin-track decision on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe and the pipelines-for-gas deal with the Soviet Union overshadowed the political discussion.

When he left Germany in 1985 he was more optimistic about its future than when he arrived.

Burns tried to discover the reasons for the irritations in the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the USA and reconcile conflicting national interests.

Together with his parents Burns came to America from Galicia, which still belonged to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, at the age of ten.

His parents had to make a new life for themselves.

Arthur Burns worked as a postman, waiter, dishwasher and shoe salesman in order to earn enough money to get advanced education and study economics.

He came to love his new homeland even though American society was not exactly keen on the Jews at that time.

Professor Burns' academic actitivites centred around the business cycle theory.

In 1953 President Eisenhower appointed him chairman of his body of economic advisers.

Burns understood how to keep this body out of political wranglings. This

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■ BOOKS ON DEFENCE

West's policies tested and found wanting

DIE ZEIT

The Soviet Union has laid brutally bare the conceptual defects and planning deficits of Western disarmament policy. The staccato of Soviet proposals keeps the Western powers breathlessly trying to keep pace with the latest position.

Those who would like to bring clarity into the confusion of single and double zero and the firecrackers of disarmament rhetoric would do well to read:

Lothar Rühl: *Mittelstreckenwaffen in Europa. Ihre Bedeutung in Strategie, Rüstungskontrolle und Bündnispolitik* (Medium-Range Missiles in Europe. Their Significance in Strategy, Arms Control and Alliance Policy), published by Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1987; 408pp, DM39.

Rühl systematically probes the importance of intermediate-range weapons in Europe and precisely outlines their role in strategy, arms control and alliance policy.

A writer with a sovereign grasp of his extremely complex subject matter, he shows himself to be a sensitive analyst of the many facets of strategic calculations, a painstaking observer of contemporary affairs and, last but not least, a man of plain words in the style of his writing.

His wide-ranging survey analyses four inseparable processes in the recent course of world affairs:

- the threat posed to the directly threatened European theatre of the North Atlantic pact by medium-range Soviet missiles;
- the exclusion of these weapon systems from the superpowers' strategic arms limitation talks;
- the consequences of the Soviet arms build-up for Nato's flexible response strategy;
- and the modernisation of longer-range intermediate weapons agreed by the terms of Nato's 12 December 1979 dual-track decision.

These interlocking problem complexes are investigated by means of questions relating to five segments of the issues involved.

They relate to views on the balance of power and how to assess it, to the technical military characteristics and operational potential of nuclear weapon systems, to the use of nuclear options in the defence of Europe, to views on threats and security requirements and to the yardsticks of success in IRNF limitation talks.

Step by step the reader is confronted with the crucial problem of the security position in the East-West conflict: the asymmetry and structural disparity of the two pacts.

Each individual asymmetry would, viewed in isolation, lead to security policy aporia.

The only way to come to constructive terms with these slopes and bends is to view them in an overall context and bundle them into negotiation packages.

Like many others, the problem of medium-range missiles cannot be solved in isolation; it interlocks with conventional and intercontinental security mechanisms.

Rühl notes the plausibility dilemma that besets European comments on security policy in a diffuse public context, saying:

"The geostrategic asymmetry of East-West conflict structure in Europe is the reason why strategic aims and means differ — the circumstances differing — between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic alliance."

Rühl's Book is both modern history and a subtle introduction into contemporary strategic thinking.

Those who have worked through its comprehensive analysis will be able to use it as a reference work in the current debate on intermediate-range disarmament proposals even though it was written before the latest round of proposals was made.

To quote the concluding chapter:

"The interface between conventional and nuclear options finds operational and strategic expression in the compound character of the deployment of Nato and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, with tactical nuclear forces on both sides.

"So it would be pointless and, for the conventionally weaker side, risky to single out nuclear weapons for arms control and to deal with them in isolation.

"Attempts by European Nato partners, in response to the post-Reykjavik priority assigned to nuclear disarmament, to link negotiations on nuclear weapons with negotiations on the balance of conventional power with a view to military options in the event of conflict are a step in the only direction that holds forth promise of gains in stability for security in Europe."

After reading Rühl's book the reader will hardly fail to arrive at a twofold conclusion with regard to the current debate.

Mr Gorbachov's proposals are aimed exactly at the weak links in the strategic thinking behind Western security policy and make full use of existing asymmetry.

The course of the East-West conflict was bound, sooner or later, to lead to Soviet proposals such as have now been presented by Mr Gorbachov. Why did the West not make even the most elementary provision for this eventuality?

Rifts in the foundations of confidence within the alliance will grow dramatically wider if a wide-eyed public is repeatedly confronted with the helplessness and perplexity of Western strategists who are reluctant to be reminded what they said in the past. Rühl's book provides strict yardsticks by which Western security policy, as currently presented, will be found wanting.

Werner Weidenfeld

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 19 June 1987)

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responsiblity for a Max Planck Institute which was set up especially for him in Starnberg, publishing "Images of Tomorrow's World — Models up until the year 2009" (1985).

During these years in Starnberg a whole series of studies were issued on various topics. *Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhütung* (The Consequences and Prevention of War), published in 1971, is one of the better-known publications of this period.

Via bestsellers such as *Wege in der Gefahr* (1976), *Der Garten des Menschlichen* (1977), *Deutlichkeit* (1978) and *Wahrnehmung der Neuzeit* (1983) Weizsäcker has tried to take his own personal stand against the prophets of doom.

The threatened peace he refers to in his book *Der bedrohte Friede* (1981) calls for "radical pacifism as the only possible path for Christians", Weizsäcker stressed during the general meeting of the Lutheran World Council in Budapest.

Wolfgang Schirmacher

(Allgemeine Zeitung, Mainz, 27 June 1987)

A story of long-term planning and short-term muddling

The US-Soviet Geneva arms control talks, as reflected in the public debate on the zero option, will continue for months, if not years.

German, and European, interests are represented only indirectly at the superpowers' talks, but alliance considerations between Washington and Bonn play a central part.

The talks deal with nuclear weapons stationed in Europe as a political and military deterrent to the Soviet Union.

Detente may have been the keynote in the 1960s and early 1970s, but since the mid-1970s problems of military security have been paramount in world affairs.

Slowly, diffidently, specialist literature on political science and military strategy has come round to tackling the subject.

A fundamental work on the complex that appeared only a few months ago is:

Hubertus Hoffmann: *Die Atompartner, Washington-Bonn und die Modernisierung der taktischen Kernwaffen* (Nuclear Partners, Washington-Bonn and the Modernisation of Tactical Nuclear Weapons), published by Bernard und Graefe Verlag, Koblenz, 1986; 550pp, DM88.

It tells a tale of concepts and misunderstandings, of clashes of interest and personal animosities, of long-term planning and short-term muddling through.

It does so knowledgeably and in detail, arguably in at times too exhaustive detail, but always at a high and critically objective level.

Hoffmann shows how, in the late 1950s, the neutrom bomb came under the crossfire of criticism.

Many people felt at the time, as others, such as the SPD's Egon Bahr did later, that the neutron bomb was a mental perversion.

Others felt it made perfect sense because, unlike other weapons of nuclear mass destruction, it concentrated its effect on people and spared, relatively speaking, installations and infrastructure, i.e. the country concerned.

He goes on to show how President Kennedy and, above all, Defence Secretary McNamara opposed the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in general and the development of the neutron bomb in particular.

It comes as something of a surprise in reading Hoffmann's analysis to realise that the introduction of the flexible response strategy was partly due to American interest in the de-nuclearisation of Western Europe, whereas in reality the number of tactical nuclear warheads was doubled to 7,000 between 1961 and 1969.

In the early 1970s the West offered, at the Vienna MBFR troop cut talks with the Warsaw Pact, to reduce the number of nuclear warheads in Western Europe by 2,000 in return for a reduction in Soviet tank units stationed in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Union refused, but as a result of the Nato dual-track "missiles and talks" decision Nato reduced by 2,400 the number of its tactical nuclear warheads.

The crucial point, Hoffmann makes it clear, is that the United States has for decades concentrated its military strategy on strategic and tactical nuclear potential yet sought since the mid-1960s a zero solution to the problem of medium-range missiles.

There were military reasons but also, and primarily, political grounds for the US withdrawal of medium-range and cruise missiles from the Federal Republic of Germany where, by 1969, they had been stationed for 10 years.

So President Reagan's 1981 zero option can be said to have some degree of tradition, being based on the widespread view that medium-range nuclear missiles are militarily superfluous in Western Europe because nuclear deterrence is sufficiently provided or guaranteed by the US strategic nuclear potential.

This line of argument became problematic to the extent that the United States forfeited its nuclear superiority and the Soviet Union built up an additional, superior medium-range potential of its own.

Against this change in background it would seem problematic that from Kennedy to Reagan all US Presidents have in principle advocated a zero solution on medium-range missiles in Western Europe.

The so-called saturation theory is lined up against the European credibility theory on nuclear weapons, with General Norstad in 1959 and later Henry Kissinger and Helmut Schmidt advocating land-based medium-range missiles in Western Europe.

Their main argument, Hoffmann says, was politically and militarily to establish a visible link between the US strategic arsenal and the defence of Western Europe.

The Salt 2 clash between President Carter and Chancellor Schmidt illustrates the difference of opinion.

President Carter did not want to burden strategic arms control with the medium-range missiles issue; Chancellor Schmidt called in vain for intermediate-range problems to be incorporated in Salt 2.

The Nato dual-track decision documents how this difference, with its more deep-seated causes, was overcome.

In Chancellor Schmidt's opinion President Carter personified what, from the European viewpoint, was a onesided and mistaken concentration on strategic arms control.

Herr Schmidt, in his celebrated October 1977 speech, drew attention to the entire new spectrum of Soviet threat, including the SS-20, and advocated an arms control approach to a solution.

Hoffmann shows, in what was initially a Bonn PhD thesis for Karl Dietrich Bracher, how the two leaders accused each other of being to blame for the neutron bomb decision.

President Carter's anti-nuclear morality prevented him from clearly advocating the neutron bomb, while Chancellor Schmidt "demonstrated a neutralism of responsibility, not defending the bomb in public."

Instead of a clear commitment, he sought cover behind saying that the decision was a US responsibility.

That was a somewhat paradoxical attitude, given that Helmut Schmidt otherwise stood for a critical, self-assured and, in foreign policy terms, emancipated Federal Republic as an independent partner of the United States.

The reason for this seeming paradox lay in twofold pressure on the Schmidt government, with both the Soviet Union and his own Social Democratic Party

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■ TRADE

Cocom tries to streamline blacklist distribution

Frankfurter Allgemeine

Cocom is the main western instrument for preventing the Soviet Union and other East Bloc countries from getting Western technical equipment *and documentation that might be militarily or strategically useful.*

Cocom, which is based in Paris, has 16 member countries. It places more and more categories of goods on the embargo list, but a big problem is the delay between agreement on what is sensitive — and therefore what must not be sold to East Bloc countries — and listing of prohibited items in individual countries.

There is a shortage of staff to transfer the contents of the Cocom lists (in English and French) into national lists of goods for export (or, in this case, not for export).

There are further manpower shortages in monitoring and permit procedures that apply to all categories of goods that are Cocom-listed.

Paperwork proliferates. Piles of application forms await stamping by the batch.

An automatic export ban does not apply to all goods that are Cocom-listed. Manufacturers who want to export them may apply for permission, which as a rule is given provided all government representatives at Cocom head office are agreeable.

There are few exceptions to this obligatory permit procedure. Where individual items are involved exemptions may be granted by national authorities, shortcutting but not eliminating the permit procedure.

If the Cocom system is to forestall more effectively the export of strategic goods to the East it must be revised and fine-tuned, and discussions are now being held with this in mind.

The process was triggered by a high-level meeting in the New Year at which unanimous agreement was reached on making the system more efficient by suitably rationalising the Cocom list and limiting ways of circumventing it.

The basic idea is that if the list were *shortened and simplified, improved inspection procedures could concentrate on the essentials.*

This marks a turning point in the history of Cocom, which was set up in 1948. Its decisions are never officially announced. Exporters are not aware of them until national export regulations are amended.

Neither national regulations nor international agreements deal with export control coordination. Formally Cocom doesn't even exist. The control and permit procedure has merely come about in the way in which it now operates.

From the outset items have both been added to the Cocom list and deleted from it as no longer sensitive, but on balance the list has grown longer with each amendment.

First pointers from within Cocom now indicate that the list is to be extended in a balanced manner and, at the same time, shortened. Even the Americans, who would like to see as much technology as possible Cocom-listed, have agreed to the change.

But US government sources hasten to add that this move must not be taken to mean a relaxation of export controls or the control system.

There is, however, a debate in progress in the United States on the effective extent of export restrictions. Surveys commissioned by US industry have shown that by no means all export restrictions need to be retained on security grounds.

President Reagan is in the process of having US export controls reappraised, clearly with a view to sounding out possibilities of easing them.

Willing though the US government may be to take part in a reappraisal of the Cocom rules, Washington remains doubtful whether the system of controls will really be more effective as a result.

Other member-countries are urged by the US government to plug gaps more consistently than they have done in the past and to use diplomatic channels to help ensure that listed goods are not rerouted in third countries.

In common with other control systems, Cocom is circumvented more or less often. But given goodwill all round, the network of controls can be drawn tighter.

All Cocom countries agree in principle that Western technology which is indispensable for East Bloc armament must not be allowed to get there.

Where they differ — and will continue to differ — is on what Western supplies are really essential for East Bloc armament.

The Bonn government, one is assured, is resolved to help make sure the Cocom system works. But if the embargo is to be enforced more strictly and with greater success it must be checked more systematically for non-essential items.

Before this is possible the German export list will need to be lengthened at least once or twice more. Most of the amendments Cocom has made since 1985 have yet to be incorporated in foreign trade regulations.

Economic Affairs Ministry officials regret not having been able to keep pace with the changes. Converting Cocom terminology to the corresponding German foreign trade categories is said to be difficult and time-consuming.

Similar backlogs, some even longer, of amendments *still awaiting inclusion* in national listings exist in other Cocom countries where neither English nor French is an official language.

An updated export list is to be published later this year and will need to be revised next spring to incorporate further amendments.

Klaus Broichhausen

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 20 June 1987)

China wants to continue its open policy

No major joint industrial projects will be raised in the talks with Bonn Chancellor Helmut Kohl when he visits China this month.

Officials in Peking say China must give priority to reducing its heavy deficit in trade with Germany.

Last year Chinese exports to Germany totalled $1bn and imports from $3.5bn.

Agreement on Chinese goods for export is difficult. China would most like to sell Germany textiles, including tablecloths and leather clothing.

Mention is also made of foodstuffs, herbs, native products, coal, cotton and finished products. An export ban has been imposed on certain chemicals and rare earths.

Liu Xiang Dong of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade says technical cooperation with Germany is good.

He told German journalists in Peking that China would continue its policy of opening the country to Western economic influence. It wanted to play its part in world trade.

German investment — 17 joint ventures with investments totalling $2… — was still low at only one per cent of foreign investment in China.

The demand for investment was particularly keen in energy, infrastructure and commodities, but deutschemark revaluation had not helped the competitive position of German firms.

Chinese pre-revolutionary debts were a problem that beset relations with many countries. China would gradually arrive at a solution.

Neither Mr Liu nor other experts were prepared to say whether and when China might raise a government loan on the German market.

The groundwork has already been laid for fund-raising via the London capital market.

Jing Shuping, executive director of the China International Trust and Investment Corp., Peking, confirms that loans are being considered.

His corporation raised its first foreign loan in Tokyo in 1982 and its first DM-denominated loan in 1985.

Chinese agencies such as Citec or the Bank of China have raised loans totalling $2.1bn, or roughly 10 per cent of Chinese foreign liabilities, in international markets.

At present 116 banks and financial institutes from 24 countries have 202 representative offices in China, says Tang Gengyao, director of the State Administration of Exchange Control, Peking, and council member of the Bank of China.

He expressly welcomed the presence of foreign banks in China. In certain areas 19 foreign banks had been permitted to operate.


Chinese experts make it clear that Shanghai is keen to remain China's financial centre.


Since 1984 it has operated a stock exchange, although sales facility would be a more appropriate name.

It sells shares in four firms and bonds issued by a further four.

Erich Erlenbach

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 29 June 1987)





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opposing the development and deployment of the neutron bomb.

Hoffmann's conclusion on the arms control situation in 1977/78 is devastating:

"Never before had relations between a German Federal Chancellor and an American President been so poor.

"Moscow made use of the wishes of, above all, the Social Democrats to cement its power-political views on a new European security order while at the same time continuing to deploy new missiles for use in Europe.

"Never were more nuclear weapons planned and stationed for use against Western Europe than in 1977, and in 1978 Bonn had achieved none of its objectives.

"The prospects of Soviet concessions on arms control were poor. There was still no uniform arms control concept. Moscow continued to manufacture and deploy nuclear weapons.

A revitalisation of detente was not in sight. Modernisation of tactical nuclear weapons was blocked. Domestic opponents of this modernisation were strengthened." (pp. 481-2).

But Carter and Schmidt had learnt from this debacle and in discussions on the Nato dual-track decision both eventually met each other half-way, albeit hesitantly and mistrustfully. The main stimulus that prompted the dual-track decision was, Hoffmann says, German frustration over the failure to include medium-range missiles in the Salt 2 talks and the growing Soviet arms build-up in all sectors.

He would have done well to outline this last point in greater detail. Part of the political debate in the Federal Republic was based on the misunderstanding that missile modernisation was solely in response to the SS-20.

The overriding outcome of the Nato dual-track decision for US-German relations was that the Carter administration met the Germans and Western Europeans half-way in revising the decision, reached in the early 1960s, to withdraw US medium-range and cruise missiles from Western Europe.

The dual-track decision to station medium-range missiles in Western Europe again ranks alongside America's historic 1949 decision to join a defence pact in peacetime as a second turning-point of historic significance in US security policy.

Helmut Schmidt played a central role in this connection. Initially a warning voice on security policy and a critic of the Carter administration who lacked an arms control policy concept of his own, he emerged in 1978 as an arms control policy architect. He included the United States in the European security edifice, whereas his Social Democrats steered clear of this trend.

Hoffmann portrays Schmidt's role with critical sympathy. The Chancellor was able to bring to an end in 1974 the phase of military strategic agony on nuclear weapons, but he was bound to realise that the SPD, having weighed his views on the balance of power in the balance, found them to be wanting.

Sad to say, his exaggerated criticism of President Carter encouraged anti-American tendencies among the Social Democrats, and the neutron bomb and dual-track decision, described by Hoffmann in security policy terms, grew into an SPD leadership and identity problem.

Hoffmann's book deals in part with the greatness and tragedy of Helmut Schmidt, a realist in power politics who was well in control of the international scene but unable to reduce the long-standing security policy shortfall, a deficit that had lasted for decades, within his own party.

It firmly ranks alongside Lothar Rühl's study on medium-range weapons in Europe as an illuminating outline of the security policy deficit of the 1970s.

Christian Hacke

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 19 June 1987)

■ BUSINESS

Cigarette companies battle for a shrinking market

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG

The outlook for German cigarette manufacturers is poor: fewer people are smoking and the population is declining and getting older.

Surveys in industrialised countries show that older people tend to smoke less. In addition, younger Germans are starting to smoke later than they used to. The proportion of smokers under 15 has fallen sharply over the past few years.

This makes the success of Marlboro, made by Philip Morris, all the more remarkable. In 15 years, it has become the best-selling cigarette in Germany. Other brands are the losers in this shrinking market. The German market has long had to abandon hopes of selling more and more cigarettes to more and more smokers. The trade can at best hope to stabilise sales that have declined since the last tax increase in 1982.

Since German smokers have had to pay another mark a pack for cigarettes from the slot machine, sales of filter cigarettes have fallen from 129 to 117 billion a year.

Manufacturers with less effective sales figures and advertising flair are having to pay the price. BAT of Hamburg, a subsidiary of the world's No. 1, BAT Industries, says its works in Ahrensburg, near Hamburg, are to be shut down in 1989.

The Ahrensburg works, with a payroll of 470, mainly manufactures HB, long the leading German brand, which was once smoked by more than one German smoker in five.

Suddenly, after 26 years in the lead the glory was over. Sales have steadily declined since 1977, despite a changed advertising and marketing concept, to 13.6 per cent of the market, leaving 30 per cent surplus production capacity.

Rationalisation was unavoidable, especially as the parent company in London is worried about the meagre profits of its German subsidiary.

Last year BAT raked in creditable profits of DM61m, but they were due solely to special business and to low-cost tobacco imports due to the dollar exchange rate. The fourth-largest German manufacturer, Martin Brinkmann of Bremen, has already retrenched. Sales of Lord Extra, Brinkmann's leading brand, plummeted by 50 per cent, so since 1982 the company has more than halved its payroll to a mere 2,000.

Last year's hopes that consolidation was finally over were dashed by a further decline in market shares and the news that Brinkmann's Bremen cigarette factory is to close down at the end of the year, putting a further 190 people out of work.

Reemtsma, Germany's No. 1, originally a family firm and without the backing of an international parent company, is also wondering how to cut costs as sales decline.

A decision has yet to be reached on which works is to be shut down: Langenhagen, Hanover, with a payroll of 525, or Lahr in the Black Forest. One seems sure to go.

High-flying sales of the brand symbolised by the Marlboro cowboy as he lazily enjoys a cigarette against the cactus-studded backdrop of Arizona are not the only reason for the difficulties faced by the industry as a whole.

Marlboro may be unbeatable at present but sooner or later another brand will doubtless make the running. The real reasons for the market's stagnation lie deeper and pose a threat to the survival of the entire industry.

It is a mere euphemism to say that cigarettes and tobacco are no longer a growth market, says BAT chief executive Ulrich Herter. Population is on the decline in the Federal Republic and many other industrialised countries, and experience shows that an ageing population smokes less. So the prospects are poor.

What is more, young people are starting to smoke at a later age. The proportion of smokers under 15 has fallen from 40 to 28 per cent.

In health and economic terms this is doubtless to be welcomed. The health insurance schemes say treatment of complaints caused by smoking costs them DM17bn a year.

An even more dangerous trend is the constantly discussed anti-smoking campaign that has already prompted Federal Health Minister Rita Süssmuth to plan far-reaching measures.

The sale of cigarettes and tobacco in shops that sell food could be prohibited. A general ban could be imposed on smoking at work. Cigarette machines could be forbidden within a specified distance of schools to spare juveniles temptation.

There is fresh talk of a ban on cigarette advertising too. Clashes between committed smokers and non-smokers are increasingly assuming the proportions of religious warfare, especially as definite conclusions on the effect of smoking have yet to be reached despite intensive research.

Statistical tables issued by the Federal Statistics Office, Wiesbaden, show lung cancer mortality to increase the heavier a smoker the victim was.

In 1960 Americans smoked over 3,500 cigarettes a head per year. Twenty years later about 55 deaths per 100,000 head of population in the US were due to lung cancer. In Thailand, by comparison, where cigarette consumption was a mere 500 per year, only eight people per 100,000 died of lung cancer.

But why do four times more people die of lung cancer in the Federal Republic than in Japan when cigarette consumption is slightly higher in Japan?

The claim that passive smoking, i.e. inhaling other people's cigarette smoke, is just as dangerous as smoking yourself is equally doubtful.

A 1981 Japanese survey showed the cancer risk among 92,000 non-smoking wives of smoking husbands to be twice as high as in non-smoking marriages.

Another survey, the results of which were published in the *British Journal of Cancer,* showed the exact opposite.

A non-smoker did not inhale the nicotine content of a single cigarette until he or she had inhaled other people's cigarette smoke non-stop for 50 hours.

Either way, the mere existence of the debate is bad for business. Smoking no longer holds forth the promise of pleasure; it creates problems.

Besides, smoking is no longer equated with blue skies above, freedom and adventure by keep-fit and health fans.

To crown it all, the industry and its work force of 130,000 people face further maltreatment at the hands of the taxman.

Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg earned over DM14bn in tobacco duty revenue last year, but that was DM500m less than the year before.

Yet next January the tax on a packet of cigarettes is to be increased by 20 pfennigs, followed by a further 20 or 30 pfennigs in 1990.

Jörg Bretschneider

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 20 June 1987)

"I like smoking", says the poster on the left. The other says: "My name is Julia and I've got cancer." (Photo: Ferdi Hartung)

Continued from page 4

was the period of the consensus among economists, which had evolved from the 1930s and Roosevelt's "New Deal", that the state should play an active role, should not allow mass unemployment, and should help the sick, the aged and the poor.

This more "liberal" side of Burns was balanced by his firm conviction that inflation is an economic evil.

He advocated this conviction and a belief that the central bank should be free of political influences during his chairmanship of the Council of Governors of the American Central Bank System between 1970 and 1978.

This explained why President Carter refused to nominate him for a third term.

Burns doggedly warded off threats to the independence of the central bank.

He was a teacher and educator — of presidents too.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 29 June 1987)

■ MOTORING

High-speed camera analyses deliberate car crashes

DIE WELT

Car crashes under controlled conditions have been standard practice since 1959. The aim is to improve design to prevent accidents and to minimise the effects when accidents do happen.

Test centres use high-speed cameras which are capable of taking 3,000 photographs a second.

Allianz is Germany's largest insurance company. It backs a research centre at Ismaning, near Munich: four powerful halogen spotlights bathe the crash studio in 60,000 units of glaring light, transforming matt grey walls into bright white.

The test car, in bright orange, is undergoing last-minute checks at its starting point. Measuring instruments are switched on and the dummies are seated in the prescribed position.

An endless steel hawser hurls the car along a 50-metre acceleration track with the power of a hydraulic motor. Seconds later, the moment of impact: a short, sharp shock.

1.3 tonnes of car crashes against the steel crash block mounted on a 200-tonne concrete wall at 50kph.

Pressed steel is deformed, plastic shredded. Unbelted back-seat passengers are catapulted through the windscreen.

The computer declares them to have died in the crash after recording an impact speed of 50kph and measuring the pressure at which the dummies, chock full of electronics, collide with the obstacles in their path.

High-speed cameras record the proceedings at the amazing rate of 3,000 exposures per second, capturing every minute detail..

"The only way to prevent accidents is to simulate and analyse them," says Max Danner, director of the research institute, which is maintained by Allianz.

If accidents must happen, then crash victims must at least be enabled to survive them.

Professor Danner and his staff have reconstructed exactly what happens in the 80 milliseconds between impact and standstill. They described it at the annual European accident research congress in Milan.

Between 0 and 13 milliseconds after impact the bumper or fender is deformed beyond recognition.

Between 14 and 30 milliseconds the driver and passengers become aware of the impact and their safety belts block.

Between 31 and 40 milliseconds the front end of the car concertinas as far as the motor block, which begins to absorb much of the impact energy. Passengers are subjected to up to 30 times the force of gravity.

In other words someone who weighs 80kg, or 176lb, suddenly weighs the nearly two and a half tonnes of an elephant.

Between 41 and 45 milliseconds the engine crashes into the rear casing of its compartment and juts 10cm into the passenger compartment.

It doesn't move beneath the car toward the rear. Instead it creates a buffer. Much higher speeds would be needed to push it further into the passenger compartment.

Motor manufacturers started crash tests in 1959 and they remain just as useful today in the computer era. A computer is only as good as the data it is fed with.

Data can only be compiled by technicians from crash tests in realistic conditions. The only difference is that fewer tests are now carried out, so costs are cut.

A hand-made prototype destroyed in crash tests can cost anything between DM600,000 and DM1m.

No manufacturer can avoid testing head-on crashes as a safety standard. Test procedures are standardised, but vary from continent to continent.

Since 1968 European Community regulations have specified that a belted passenger must survive a crash at an impact speed of 50kph without serious injury.

In America the injury ratings of crash test dummies are divided into categories — knees, chest and head — with weird theoretical consequences arising from taking the average of the three.

Crash test findings may be excellent for head and knees but fatal because of breast injuries, yet the overall rating is satisfactory and the vehicle passes its test!

Professor Danner dismisses this practice as nonsense. "An international standard on a sensible test basis is indispensable," he says, "because people everywhere are in equal danger."

In addition to safety tests the Munich centre also carries out damage and cost analysis trials at 15kph, including head-on and side-on collisions and the crash into the car in front.

Fifteen kilometres, or nine miles, an hour may not seem much, but even at this speed metal is deformed and unbelted passengers are catapulted into the windscreen.

Comprehensive and fire and theft insurance ratings are based on the findings of these damage and cost analysis trials. They decide the premium.

Mitsubishi figures show how greatly the findings can vary between cars made by one manufacturer. The cost of repairing the Cordia convertible is twice as high as for the Tredia saloon.



A dummy meets it fate: camera catches moment of impact at test centre.
(Photo: Die Welt)

Findings of importance for passenger safety in general also come to light, as recent trials of the Opel Omega have shown.

"After the 15kph impact," Professor Danner says, "the rear doors could no longer be opened from within. The car body had been deformed right back to the rear wheel case.

"The impact also affected the roof, causing a concertina fold that was most expensive to repair."

Professor Danner has arranged for an interview with design staff at the Opel works in Rüsselsheim, Frankfurt, and is confident design changes will be undertaken.

They were at BMW in Munich when prototypes of the 7 series failed to live up to expectations.

At BMW engineers then designed easily deformable impact boxes mounted behind the bumpers. Professor Danner feels the BMW is currently the safest in the world where crash impact is concerned.

The Volkswagen Golf, or Rabbit, also had trouble with passive safety at the development stage. It took 23 design trials before ratings were ideal.

Basically, Professor Danner says, all cars today are designed for safety, even the smallest compacts. Yet only eight years ago passengers in a French car would hardly have survived a crash at even 30kph (20mph).

Accident research, which is never completed, is at present mainly concerned with lateral protection and the approximation of vehicle sizes and shapes ("collision compatibility").

Safety experts say the front sections of heavy cars ought to be made weaker and those of lightweight cars stronger. On impact the concertina and shock absorption effect would be identical.

Road-users are exhorted to be partners, but Professor Danner says car-makers are, surprisingly, showing signs of partnership:

"In the past it would have been inconceivable, but design engineers with up-market manufacturers now incorporate features aimed at protecting other road users."

Lateral protection is relevant in this context, bearing in mind that side-on crashes at crossroads hit the weakest part of the car body, with only a few centimetres to absorb the shock of impact.

Accident research has disproved the longstanding claim that an easily repaired car and passenger safety are mutually exclusive; a sound compromise is possible.

This is shown by crash tests in which cars are destroyed first and foremost to save lives.

Heinz Horrmann
(Die Welt, Bonn, [illegible] 1987)

A true story: how the limousine emerged as a subjective factor

The car we drive comes second only to the clothes we wear as an extension of our personalities in public appearance. Marque and model, model year and maybe even the number plate are a deliberate choice.

Answers to a September 1986 Allensbach poll query "Are you proud of your car?" show how seriously people take their cars.

Fifty-six per cent said they were either definitely proud or proud by and large of their automobile. Only 34 per cent said not really or not all. Ten per cent claimed to be undecided.

The German's relationship with his car goes far beyond the mere use of it. It affects the innermost circle of the family and the individual and the outermost circle of, say, national feeling.

One German in two, when asked what Germans can be proud of, mentions the motor industry.

Pride in one's own car and in the German motor industry are not a minor detail to be derided. Market research has dealt for some years with pride and found it, as far as can be inferred from poll data, to be more benign than harmful in effect.

In the sense of pride the ego and the environment are linked in an enlivening and selfless manner.

The strengthening effect of pride and the close connection between pride in one's country, one's family and one's work can be demonstrated by poll findings in all Western countries and Japan.

We all know how much derision has been poured on the German and his love of his car, but what are the real reasons for it?

Car ownership is linked with freedom and self-realisation, and it must be borne in mind that no other subjective factor has such a powerful influence on man's well-being as the feeling of freedom and of freedom of decision.


The car as a means to individual freedom and free decisions daily is reason enough for the leading role it plays in our lives, even a crucial experience for young people at the wheel of their first car.

Yet the individual can hardly be said to experience more vividly than at the wheel of a car how much his own freedom depends on respecting the freedom of others and on abiding by the rules.

Motoring is a non-stop course in the rules of social behaviour. Traffic offenders are unquestionably offenders and liberalism is reduced to a diminutive leeway for rebellion, such as warning oncoming motorists of a radar check.

Motoring is thus to be seen as a training course in legal awareness, which is in jeopardy in contemporary society.

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■ SPACE RESEARCH

Divided opinions on how far, how soon and how much it all should cost

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG

Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher is a space technology enthusiast. No other cabinet minister supports the idea of extending Germany's involvement in space research as strongly as he.

Genscher says space research is not a luxury. It is essential for the solution of many of the world's problems, such as environmental protection, the search for raw materials, and the forecasting of harvests.

Genscher is also convinced that new research possibilities will later lead to the production of new materials.

Inspired by the activities of the Soviet Union, Genscher favours building huge solar-cell satellites, which could help guarantee the world's energy supply.

As Foreign Minister, he also sees the positive aspects of European cooperation in the field of space travel.

Success here could distract attention from the sorry state of the Community's agricultural policy.

His main worry is that Europe might be edged out of space by the USA, the Soviet Union and Japan with the result that the Old World would become a second-rate continent in political, economic and technological terms.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Bonn Foreign Minister champions the cause of a European space research policy.

The best approach, Genscher feels, is to set up a new national space research organisation.

By autumn he will try to persuade Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his cabinet colleagues that his policy strategy is the right one.

By then Bonn has to make up its mind whether it wants to participate in three major space projects which will dominate western space travel up until the end of the century: the Ariane V rocket, the European Hermes space shuttle project, and European involvement via the Columbus spacelab in the US space station.

With the latter project President Reagan hopes to follow in the footsteps of President Kennedy's moon programme.

In November the European Space Agency (Esa) wants to know where Bonn stands, and the Americans have been waiting for a definite assurance for some time.

The Bonn Research Ministry expects each project to cost roughly DM10bn, not including several billion marks more for ancillary and monitoring equipment.

According to its latest forecast, the ESA will be spending roughly 33 billion units of account on the space programme up until the year 2000.

Together with the three major projects the programme encompasses other developments, such as the recoverable space platform Eureca.

As this calculation was made on the basis of 1986 prices the Research Ministry in Bonn expects a nominal figure of approximately DM100bn for the entire programme.

The Federal Republic of Germany currently finances 28 per cent of the Esa budget, which would amount to DM28bn by the end of the century.

It is understandable, therefore, that Bonn Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg does not share the enthusiasm for space technology shown by his colleage Genscher.

He is already having difficulty finding the money he needs for existing tasks without running up more debt.

Bonn Research Minister Heinz Riesenhuber is also racking his brains over how to organise and finance West German efforts.

So far he has only promised to elaborate a national space research concept, but has not yet delivered the goods.

He knows, however, that these activities cannot be solely justified on research policy grounds, i.e. should not be primarily funded by his ministry's budget (which currently provides DM1.1bn for space projects).

Nevertheless, he is also spending a great deal of money in the decision-making phase which began in 1985 — in the case of Hermes, 1986 — and has now been extended until the end of 1987.

One of the major reasons for this extension was the Challenger explosion and the subsequent demands for much higher safety standards.

The costs for the German contribution have risen by over 100 per cent, from DM247m to DM502m.

Roughly 750 space industry employees in the Federal Republic alone are working on the concepts.

It is hoped that their efforts will in future be much better organised within the framework of a national space agency, along the lines of the Nasa in the USA.

Bavaria's Premier Franz Josef Strauss agrees with Hans-Dietrich Genscher that greater efforts in this field are absolutely essential.

Strauss has already written to Chancellor Kohl urging him to set up a German space agency called Nara on a private law basis and located in Munich.

Research Minister Riesenhuber has also forwarded a cabinet proposal suggesting the establishment of a space agency on a similar basis.

The name suggested by Riesenhuber was *Deutsche Raumfahrtagentur GmbH* (Dara).

Riesenhuber would like this agency take on space travel orders for all ministries, e.g. for the Federal Post Office too, but be responsible to his ministry.

This is why, together with North-Rhine Westphalia premier Johannes Rau, he would prefer a location somewhere near Bonn, for example Porz-Wahn.

The *Deutsche Forschungs- und Versuchsanstalt für Luft- und Raumfahrt (DFVLR)* already carries out organisational tasks there in the field of aviation and space research on behalf of the Research Ministry.

It is also hoped that the decision on the national space agency will be taken by autumn.

This would end the sorry state of affairs criticised in Riesenhuber's cabinet proposal.

The proposal underlines that there is general agreement on the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany is currently not in the position in the field of international space research that it should be in view of its outstanding technological and economic potential.

This claim is not as undisputed as the Bonn Research Ministry maintains.

Parliamentarians from the FDP and SPD, for example, abstained in the budget committee during a vote on whether to provide additional millions of marks for the preparation phase.

Jürgen Ruttgers from the CDU/CSU Bundestag parliamentary group found this a most suprising in view of Genscher's statements and a paper presented by the SPD research expert Josef Vosen.

The SPD paper stated that, for reasons of European self-assertion, the SPD parliamentary party should approve of Hermes and Ariane.

The Columbus project, however, should be rejected if the space station is also to be used for military purposes.

SPD Bundestag member Albrecht Müller explained that the accusation that this would be a gigantic misinvestment as in the case of the fast breeder reactor had not yet been disproved.

The deputy chairman of the SPD parliamentary group Wolfgang Roth felt obliged to make a press statement in which the SPD confirmed that it wants to reach a decision on this problem by October.

The Greens claim that German participation in space research activities is a waste of billions of marks of taxpayers' money.

The Greens parliamentary party passed a resolution calling for a stop to all space projects for two years.

During this period, they added, public discussions should be held on the pros and cons of European space research.

Wolfgang Koch
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 30 June 1987)

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The basic rules of peaceful coexistence in society and state are not absolutely clear either rationally or emotionally. Not many people think in terms of abiding by the laws.

Instead they feel bound by their conscience. They act in keeping with what their conscience tells them, and what it says can justify violence.

The position at the wheel of a car is in contrast absolutely clear. It is self-evident that failure to abide by the highway code can have catastrophic results. So motoring is a course in responsibility.

What exactly do we mean by a sense of responsibility? It can be learnt in traffic because we are forced to realise the consequences of our own behaviour.

The consequences of a mistake we have made cannot be blamed on others.

Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 20 June 1987)

Frau Noelle-Neumann is the head of the Allensbach opinion poll organisation

■ ARCHAEOLOGY

New insights into a Palmyrian past

Hannoversche Allgemeine

A collection of archaeological treasures from the ancient Syrian city of Palmyra is on show at the new Schirn museum in Frankfurt.

The exhibition has been made possible because of the cooperation of Poland, which has been closely connected with Palmyra for many years.

Diggings have been taking place in Palymra since the end of the 19th century. The Poles have been involved for about 25 years and, out of recognition for their efforts, the Syrian authorities allowed an exhibition to be taken to Warsaw.

Later it went on to other cities in the East Bloc and to Linz, in Austria, where an exhaustive catalogue was put together.

The exhibition itself is small but the beauty of its pieces makes up for this. More importantly they give an impression of the interaction between art and politics and corrects many a lop-sided assessment of Palmyrian artistic achievement.

Palmyra is still an architectural wonder. The old part of the city is still intact. It has a magnificent avenue lined with columns, an administrative district with a theatre and an enormous temple to the god Bel.

Palmyra avoided the fate of comparable cities such as Petra, in Jordan, which became forgotten.

The arrival of the Islamic age rescued it from obscurity. The Moslems turned old memories of the city into a legend. They believed that demons acting on the command of King Solomon built the place.

In this day and age we know better. The city was already in existence about 2000 B.C. and was even then a trading centre connecting Damascus with the Euphrates region.

The Romans were responsible for the city's rise to prominence. In 100 A.D. a thousand years after Solomon, Rome reached an agreement which guarenteed border security and which brought about a long period of peace in the Near East.

Emperor Tiberius annexed the city sometime between 14 and 37 A.D. In 212 A.D. she came under Roman civil law. Because of this historians had always looked upon Palmyra as a Roman province and saw its art in terms of Greco/ Roman culture.

The exhibition displays many departures which contradict such a view.

Palmyrian sculpture tries to hide as much of the body as possible under ornamentally draped garments. Like the architecture it gives way to a clear Greco/ Roman shaping with a baroque like joy in attending to detail, the results of which are nevertheless a motionless rigidity

The figures which confront the viewer head on are just as rigid. The Romans loved to segment surfaces with introspective expressions, whereas the Palmyrians broke up surfaces with lines. This led art historians to believe that a degeneration of Greco/Roman art had taken place.

But now the view is that Roman and Parthenian elements sharing a common Hellenistic basis came together to form a cultural and artistic mix. This mixture must be seen in terms of Palmyra's political situation. Despite Roman domination, the city retained a large measure of political, financial and military independence. And it remained to an extent a mediator between Rome and Parthia. This expressed itself in terms of a cultural and linguistic independence. They spoke Aramaic which was the language of Jesus Christ. But for this independence, the city would not have experienced historically great and tragic events between 269 A.D. and 273 A.D.

Interaction between art and politics: Allat temple relief, 1st century AD. (Photos: Catalogue)

It was an era of violent unrest. The empire was economically weak and was being hard pressed by Germanic tribes on its borders.

It looked like the end for Rome. The empire was governed by Emperors who were military men, and who fell with regularity to all kinds of conspiracies.

In the near east the Assadian Porsians had wiped out the Parthian empire in 227 A.D. which was another Roman front.

Under the threat of collapse the Palmyrians substituted their republic with a monarchy.

In 267 A.D. the Persians destroyed Emperor Valerian in battle and took him prisoner.

The defence of the border area fell to



Relief showing Marta with child, 2nd century AD.

the Palmyrians and they did this so successfully that the Romans felt they had become too powerful.

King Odainath, the city's first King was murdered together with his son and heir, probably by Emperor Gallienus.

Their to the throne lost control to Zenobia. Zenobia is one of history's great women but has been forgotten. History has not given her the reputation which she deserves.

When one thinks of famous women one is more likely to think of Cleopatra, the mistress of Mark Anthony and Julius Caesar.

Julia Mammea the mother of the weak Emperor Alexander Serverus, carved out a historical reputation by running his affairs.

She is rivalled by the pious Helena, the mother of Constantin the Great, who did so much for christianity in Rome.

Then there is the evil Theodora who rose from strumpet to being the wife of Justinian Caesar.

Zenobia ruled from 267 to 272 A.D. and ended up controlling about half the empire. By 270 A.D. she had conquered Egypt and large areas of Asia Minor.

In 270 A.D. she made an offer to Emperor Aurelian to share the empire. He turned it down and she subsequently laid claim to the lot but unfortunately for herself and her son she lost the war which followed.

In 272 A.D. she was taken to Rome where she more than likely died a peaceful death.

The Romans spared Palmyra. But an insurrection a few years later forced them to raize the residential section to the ground. Fortunately the important buildings and monuments were remained largely untouched.

Emperor Diocletian stabilised the empire and based a legion in the city to patrol the eastern borders. But the city had now ceased to be play a historical role.

The Frankfurt exhibition is concerned with the decades which lead up to Palmyra's glory.

The exhibition has mainly grave findings on display which and are highlighted by the original way in which the exhibition's architechture portrays the city's burial customs.

Right at the entrance there is an underground burial chamber, a so-called Hypogaum, of which a copy was made in Styropor. Bodies were placed into them and covered with slabs which often bore the faces of the deceased.

There are other consecrated reliefs such as the slab-covered towers of the dead on view in other rooms. Some of them reach a height equalling five floors and have a capacity for about 300 graves.

Why one type of grave went underground and the other reached for the heavens remains today still unexplained. A third room contains a mina-

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Grave yields up 7000-year-old bloody secret

Archaeologists have been able to piece together details of a prehistoric bloodbath from ancient human remains discovered in a south German cabbage patch.

Bits and pieces of skeletons belonging to an estimated 34 people were recovered in 1983 by a gardener in the Baden-Württemberg town of Talheim when he dug into a pit about three metres long and one and a half metres wide.

Researchers say the dead people were most of the inhabitants of a village which had been wiped out 7,000 years ago — and the reason for the attack was murder, not plunder.

The find has been studied by anthropologist Joachim Wahl and forensic specialist König. They say that the victim village probably comprised about five families belonging to the so-called band-ceramic culture at a time when the best arable land was occupied and new tribes were struggling to survive with less fertile land.

It seems that this shortage of land was the motive. Another band-ceramic group picked out a smaller settlement and attacked it with an array of farm utensils as weapons. The damage to the skulls shows that the attackers did not have weapons such as flint axes.

The sheer ferocity of the attack is shown by the fact that sex or age had been no protection: most of the victims were aged between 20 and 34, but the remains of babies and old women were also found. One old woman had curvature of the spine caused by tuberculosis. The bodies had been bound hand-and-foot and dumped into the grave.

The population at this time was apparently increasing sharply and many tribes were beginning to starve. So young men without prospects of ever owning land picked on this smaller and remote band-ceramic village for the land.

Although they had limited weapons some did have bows and arrows and used them on the fleeing villagers.

The number of cracked skulls show that the villagers were mercilessly beaten to death. It is a violent scene which strongly contradicts the popular idea of the civilised nature of the farmers of the band-ceramic culture.

Marks on the skulls of the victims show that the villagers were no strangers to violence. The investigators were able to ascertain that several of the dead had previously had had blows to the head.

One old man would appear to have received a dent in the head some 10 years earlier, but somehow he had managed to survive.

Those who could run managed to escape. This explains why few 14-to-20 year olds were among the dead. Some would also have been taken as booty. The remains of only one under 20 year old, apart from babies, was found.

In other stone age graves, children usually make up about half the dead. This corresponds to what was probably the actual proportion of young people in the village.

So the investigators concluded that the violence was the result of the material needs of the attackers who were prepared to wipe out a village to change their predicament.

Dieter Kapff

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 5 June 1987)



■ FILMS

Festival runs risk of turning into an ostentatious facade

Hannoversche Allgemeine

More than 100,000 people visited the 5th Munich Film Festival — in 1983 it drew just 25,000.

Major international productions, European perspectives, unknown Soviet films, new German films, American children's films and films from and about East Germany were some of the main categories.

Almost 130 films were screened in 11 cinemas. Symposia and seminars on women's films, films by and about black people, film music or problems associated with new media laws ran parallel to the films.

Together with the discussions with film directors, distributors and producers this created the atmosphere of a living workshop.

Organisational and structural shortcomings cannot belittle the festival's overall success.

Nevertheless, the festival's problems should be mentioned, above all the fundamental contradictions in its conception.

The festival is at a crossroads. When film festival director Eberhard Hauff first launched the event in 1983 he hailed it as an alternative to the more prestige-oriented festivals.

The festival was intended for the public, without elitist barriers, and open to new ideas.

This, however, does not fit in with the festival's growing trend towards becoming a rendezvous for the "in-people" of the branch, an ostentatious facade, a gala concert with a VIP lounge and lavish gastronomy, private receptions and parties, parties, parties.

Hauff had hardly banished Munich's "beautiful people" to the city's cultural "fortress" in the *Am Gasteig* by keeping pop and disco down to a minimum when he started letting them in through the backdoor.

Anyone with the corresponding invitation was thus able to have a great time at the 9-day festival without seeing a single film.

The Munich festival is no longer all that different to the other festivals, apart from the fact that there is no official competition and awarding of prizes — which Hauff in principle views as "foolish".

He's right, and Woody Allen is not the only one who would agree with him.

One can only hope that he will stick to his principles in future.

The advance publicity and information provided on the festival also left a great deal to be desired.

Ninety per cent of the festival-goers are younger than 30. Advance notification hardly seems to reach older people.

Admittedly, cinema audiences are becoming younger and younger, but this is no reason to sit back and do nothing to stop this trend.

Many people at the festival complained that it was difficult to distinguish between the various categories of film. A better programme could help here.

The film-makers should also be given a greater opportunity to talk to the public.

The British film director John Boorman (*Excalibur, The Emerald Forest*), for example, whose film *Hope and Glory* was the brilliant climax to the festival, had a very low-profile presentation.

There was only a brief presentation of his personal facts and figures and a few words about the film before it was shown. This was definitely not enough.

Bourman's film is an in every respect successful look back at everyday life in London during the Second World War, primarily as seen through the eyes of children.

With brilliant mischievousness the director confronts the petty vices and problems of the petty-bourgeois with the patriotic longing for glory and the unrealistic visions of the grandeur of war.

The British film was particularly well represented in both the international programme and the category of up-and-coming young directors.

Although most of the productions were television coproductions they revealed the epic and emotional qualities of great cinema films, one example being Nicolas Roeg's love story *Castaway*, which deals with the battle of the sexes on a lonely island.

The German coproductions, on the other hand, smacked of TV convention after the first few camera shots.

In addition, there was often too much harrowing psychologising and thematic refuge in the past.

Other German films in this field, however, deserve the rating "outstanding": Ulf Miehe's satirical burlesque *Der Unsichtbare*, the story of a cracked-up TV compère; *Todeszone* by Nataniel Gutman, the fate of a reporter in the Middle East war; Joseph Rusnac's psychodrama *Das Fenster von Rouet*: or Ralf Huettner's getaway film *Das Mädchen mit den Feuerzeugen*, full of furious wit and comical poetry.



Hope and Glory on the streets of wartime London. Directed by John Boorman. (Photo: Neue Constantin Film)

An undeniable festival highlight was the category of unknown Soviet films, many of which were shot in the 1950s, put away in dusty archives and shown for the first time in Munich.

In many cases one wonders why they were banned in view of their harmless political content.

Presumably it was because of the negative attributes of some of the characters shown or the formalism which did not fit in with the concept of socialist realism.

A film by Vytautas Zalakevicius, for example, the self-critical analysis of a scientist entitled *Chronik eines Tages* (Chronicle of One Day), provides associative montages.

Die Stufe (The Step) by Aleksandr Rechviashvili is an amusing parody of the refusal to conform to norms.

Eine Quelle für die Durstigen by Yuri Ilienko is a study of an old man with a magical relationship to nature.

A presentation of the works of the Spanish director and screenplay writer Manual Gutièrrez Aragòn, one of the most important representatives of the new Spanish film, was another festival highlight.

There has been a considerable renewal in this field since Franco's regime and many talents exist alongside Carlos Saura.

There was an enthusiastic response to the film *Hollywood Shuffle* by the independent American film-maker Robert Townsend.

The film is an elegant lampoon by a black person of the "white film industry".

The productions from Latin America, Asia and Africa demonstrated conspicuous vitality.

Der Läufer (The Runner) by Amir Naderi, the first Iranian film to reach us in years, is one example.

It describes with passionate empathy the existential struggle of a young boy.

Whereas people in many western countries struggle with mannerisms and self-pitying internalisation young boys such as those presented in the film fight for survival every day.

At long last the Third World is being afforded the importance it deserves.

Günter Jurczyk

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 30 June 1987)

How the Nazis gutted an industry's talent

An exhibition at the German Film Museum in Frankfurt on the fate of those from the film industry forced to flee from Nazi Germany in the 1930s gives a rough idea of the tremendous loss of artistic potential, critical intelligentsia and human qualities caused by the flight.

The exhibition was conceived by Ronny Loewy and outlines the break in the history of the German film industry — a break whose repercussions are still felt today.

The forced emigration of German-language film-makers began following the speech given by Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels to the chief organisation of the film industry on 28 March, 1933.

Film-makers of Jewish descent were already "advised" to abandon their activities in the film industry by 1935 in the first Exclusion Decree (1 November, 1933).

The exodus of émigrés fleeing from Nazi terror in 1933 first led to Vienna, Prague, London and Paris, obvious first choices because of familiar languages and cultures.

Following the Nuremberg decrees in 1935, however, the exodus became worldwide.

France was the most important European country of emigration, but actors such as Elisabeth Bergner, Fritz Kortner, Oskar Homolka and Paul Henreid soon found work in Britain.

Kurt (Curtis) Bernhardt and Alexander Korda even set up their own film production companies. When the war broke out the émigrés were strictly controlled and put in internment camps.

Following public criticism the film artists affected in Britain were eventually released.

Hollywood was the most enticing and safest place for the film industry emigrants from Nazi Germany to gather.

Despairing letters to friends or helpers, entry and exit documents (Lang, Ophüls) testify to the many attempts to bring the persecuted Jews to safety.

Paul Kohner, who was brought to *Universal* in 1921 by the producer Carl Laemmle, set up his own own agency in 1937 and employed many emigrant European actors.

Via the European Film Fund he gave them support to flee from Germany and to facilitate integration in America.

However, very few of the nameless actors and directors made a great career for themselves.

Success of the kind achieved by Marlene Dietrich, Peter Lorre, Luise Rainer (two Oscars), Fritz Lang, Max Ophüls, Billy Wilder or Douglas Sirk were the exception.

Language difficulties, cultural difference and, above all, the loss of their own identity drove many to the brink of despair.

Under the pressure of permanent integration problems and as if in anticipation of the dispute with Fritz Lang, Bertolt Brecht wrote the following on 4 December, 1941:

Ich bin der glücksgott, sammelnd um mich ketzer / auf glück bedacht in diesem jammertal / bin agitator, schmutzaufwirbler, hetzer / und hiermit — macht die tür zu — illegal.

The exhibition in Frankfurt plainly and self-critically describes the comparatively successful involvement of film émigrés in the anti-Nazi films made between 1939 and 1945.

Films such as *Confessions of a Nazi Spy*, made by Anatole Litvak in 1939 as

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MEDICINE

Minister warns: Aids also individual responsibility

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

Aids cannot be beaten by governments if people do not behave responsibly and take care of themselves, Bonn *Health Minister Rita Süssmuth told the Eighth World Sexology Congress*, in Heidelberg.

Dr Theresa L. Crenshaw, an American specialist, said it was appalling that millions of Aids virus carriers, most of them unaware that they were infected, were still sexually active.

The congress dealt with many issues including traditional medical topics such as gynaecology, contraception, venereal diseases, fertility and sterility; it ranged to the role of women and, above all, the various forms of homosexuality.

Frau Süssmuth said people still thought too biologically and not in sufficiently social or human terms on sexual matters.

Much too little was known about the subject and the main feeling about it was a deeply rooted sense of fear.

Contraception had made women freer but not more independent. Sexuality could make people richer, happier and more fulfilled.

There were certain questions that the congress should consider, said Frau Süssmuth in her opening address. What, for instance, is safer sex? The public — and even the medical profession — had little or no real idea what sexual behaviour and practices offer protection from Aids.

Safer sex meant not just using condoms but also reducing the number of sexual partners and changing sexual behaviour.

US sexologist Erwin J. Haeberle lamented a "gigantic shortfall" in knowledge on the subject.

Dr Crenshaw, of the US Association of Sex Consultants and Therapists disagreed with Professor Haeberle, saying there was no such thing as safe sex with carriers of the Aids virus.

Haeberle conceded that the use of condoms was safe to only a limited extent, but their universal use would substantially stem the tide and help to stop Aids from spreading.

He also felt there were many sexual practices other than coitus that could be lifesaving alternatives. HIV carriers must not be told sexual contacts with their partner were now taboo.

Dr Crenshaw said using condoms was not the solution. Who, she asked, was going to entrust his (or her) life to a condom?

The idea that millions of Aids virus carriers, most of whom were unaware they were infected, were still sexually active was appalling. Defensive sexual behaviour was called for, she said.

If you can't be good, be careful!

Bonn Health Minister Rita Süssmuth with a poster wishing travellers a nice holiday and warning them not to come back with Aids. (Photo: AP)

Society would return to monogamous relationships on health rather than on moral grounds. Therapists ought to motivate clients to abide by monogamy and to help couples not to feel it to be monotonous.

Too many professional and interest groups were represented at the Heidelberg congress for the nascent scientific discipline to assume a uniform appearance.

But the range of issues raised and countries — over 50 — represented made it clear that sexuality, as one of the most important sectors of life, has united research scientists in their bids to combat conventional venereal diseases and the latest scourge, Aids.

In the 1920s Berlin began to emerge as an international centre of sexual research associated with men such as Hirschfeld, Kronfeld and Marcuse.

J. H. Schultz, the founder of autogenic training, taught pupils, clients and readers in the narrower context of his psychotherapeutic work and the wider context of his books the importance of sexology for physical and mental health.

The Heidelberg congress provided German scientists in particular with food for thought and tasks to tackle. Onesided theology and rigorous philosophical ethics made do for too long with merely stipulating demands. Life has now passed morality by.

But are people any happier as a result? Sexual pleasure can neither be demanded nor achieved by struggle. It needs to be painstakingly nursed and enabled to grow as a supreme value arising from work on one's own character.

As long as sexuality is seen solely in terms of physical fulfilment to gain pleasure rather than as something total to be shared, as a gift of shared life and experience, it will trigger fears of being required to perform and to live up to expectations and leave basic human longing unfulfilled.

About 1,000 sexologists, psychiatrists, psychologists and doctors from Europe, America, Africa and Asia attended the congress. It was the first congress of its kind to be held in Germany since the war, sexology having been banned in the Third Reich and many experts forced to emigrate.

Klaus Thomas

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 28 June 1987)

A nap at midday more than an indulgence, say researchers

People should have a short sleep at midday if they can, say two Munich psychiatrists, Jürgen Zulley and Scott Campbell.

In years of research with volunteers in an underground shelter the two Max Planck Psychiatry Institute research scientists have confirmed that man's inner clock is ready for a short sleep around lunchtime.

Their findings earned them the 1986 W. R. Hess Prize of the European Sleep Research Society.

Body temperature declines around midday, corresponding to a rest phase in the human organism.

If everyone could do what they wanted people would not just take a nap at 1 p.m. but also at 10 a.m. and 5 p.m., the Munich findings show.

In Germany, scientists have concentrated on the day-and-night rhythm of waking and sleeping and on the nature of nocturnal sleep.

Sleep research in, say, the United States has not been limited to this restricted approach, as Jürgen Zulley calls it. A midday nap is common enough in other societies.

The Lapps in Scandinavia and the Bedouins in the desert both rest at various times of day. Many people in Mediterranean countries wouldn't dream of allowing their siesta to be interrupted.

Greeks sleep for up to two hours after lunch, with 42.2 per cent of the urban population taking a midday nap between one and three times a week.

They do so not only at the height of summer but also in winter. Afterward, or so they say, they feel mentally and physically fitter.

"The signs are that Germans used to sleep during the day too," Zulley says. But that was long ago. Industrialisation ended the habit.

Industrial workers could only sleep at night — and needed to do so in order to recover from a hard day's work and regain strength to face the new day.

It has since been considered normal

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THE ENVIRONMENT

Spring cometh and doth bring algae and other creepy things to life

DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT

Lakes come back to life in spring, starting with tiny algae, or vegetable plankton, that grow fast and furiously in sunlight.

They are the "grass" of the lake, the staple diet of animal plankton, and form the basis of many stages of development in the course of which micro-organisms in the water go through their seasonal cycle.

The origins of this annual pageant — and the upsets it can undergo — are the research speciality of scientists at the Max Planck Institute of Limnology in Plön, Holstein.

Their work aims to unravel a complex network of interaction, coexistence and competition between numerous organisms that form part of the eco-system of ponds and lakes.

The annual life cycle of a lake not only sheds light on ecological factors; it also illustrates mechanisms of evolutionary adaptation.

Fresh water lakes in temperate zones are classic examples of eco-systems. Unlike land-based biotopes, they are distinct and clearly outlined zones, the borderline between air and water ruling out closer ties between organisms in the lake and outside it.

This applies both to chemical properties, such as the degree of acidity in the water, and to its temperature, which never falls below zero centigrade and never rises above 25-30° C, or 77-86° F.

The lake water's substantial heat capacity acts as a puffer, offsetting short-term atmospheric temperature variations. So daily changes in the weather have little effect on the lake, which is influenced mainly by the seasonal cycle.

In a way lakes can be compared with islands. Organisms that live in it cannot simply migrate when population density grows too great.

They are bound to the lake, which plays a leading role in relations between the species that share this limited *Lebensraum* and have to come to terms within it.

In probing these relations Professor Winfried Lampert and research staff at the eco-physiology unit of the Max Planck Institute of Limnology deal less with fish and other macroscopic forms of life than with microscopic organisms — plankton — in the water.

Their interest is in how this community of micro-organisms develops in the course of the year and how man upsets the natural rhythm.

The annual cycle begins in spring when the lake awakes from its winter slumber.

In temperate-zone lakes temperatures are usually stable in winter, at 0° C immediately beneath the ice and 4° C at lower depths.

This temperature corresponds to the fact that water reaches its greatest density and specific gravity at four degrees centigrade.

In spring the surface water is heated and the water mixed by winds, resulting in a stable summer temperature configuration of warm surface water and colder water beneath.

The spring mixture brings to the surface soluble phosphorus, carbon, nitrogen and silicium compounds that serve as nutrient for microscopic algae, usually single-cell organisms.

These algae — vegetable plankton or phytoplankton — are the basis of all food cycles in a lake. They rely on photosynthesis, using the sunlight as their metabolic energy source.

As primary producers of organic matter they play the same key role in lakes, seas and oceans as more advanced plants on land, which is why plankton is known as the "grass of the sea."

The first sunlight of spring triggers plankton life in the lake. Tiny, fast-growing algae initially competing for the limited sunlight multiply en masse.

As the days grow longer and warmer and the light lasts longer, the algae grow faster and more furiously and encounter selective pressure from two quarters.

Animal micro-organisms, zooplankton, are the one. They include water fleas and live on a diet of phytoplankton, grazing on the "grass of the seas" as it were.

The other source of pressure is that algae which initially multiply unhindered gradually exhaust the nutrient in the upper, light-filled stratum of the water.

The individual varieties of algae engage in increasingly ferocious competition for progressively declining supplies of vital raw materials that make up their diet.

These twin pressures lead to a gradual change in the composition of the plankton community in the lake. Varieties that cannot withstand the pressure die and others, better suited to the competition, take their place.

Limnologists call this succession of species "autogenic succession." Laymen might like to think of it as "self-controlled hereditary succession."

By virtue of their inter-relationship organisms that occur at a given time determine which organisms will take their place. This succession can be readily observed in early summer at the clear water stage.

Within a few days visibility improves from less than one metre to up to 10 metres, these figures being depths at which a white disc is visible to the naked eye.

The reason for this extreme clarity of the water, which often lasts for only a fortnight or so, was long disputed.

Does the density of algae decline with their nutrient reserves or is it a case of zooplankton being particularly voracious at this stage?

Max Planck limnologists have proved in field trials that the clear water stage is due to the voracious appetite of zooplankton, which reaches its greatest density and consumes several times the daily output of algal biomass.

The zooplankton in turn now encounters pressure from two quarters. It too serves as fish fodder and exhausts its own food supply, the phytoplankton.

It then declines in density and undergoes changes in composition due to the sharp decline in nutrient supplies in the surface water.

These supplies are absorbed by the biomass of phyto- and zooplankton, which die and sink to the deeper water and the lake-bed.

Smaller, fast-growing varieties of algae are now replaced by larger, slower-growing kinds of seaweed better suited in their dietary requirements than their "affluent society" predecessors to the more limited supply of nutrient.

Pressure also results from the voracious appetite of zooplankton, with the result that gelatinous algae increase in quantity, being less easily filtered by or undigestible for zooplankton.

The "grass" thus gives way to "thistles" that zooplankton on the graze either ignores or cannot digest.

This realignment among the algae in turn affect the zooplankton, which adapts to a less bumper diet (in comparison with the spring surfeit).

This, then, is in outline the seasonal cycle of plankton in lake life. The details are extraordinarily complex, with each of the numerous plankton varieties forming a separate and distinct part of the dense network of inter-relationships, affecting it and being affected by it.

In addition to the activities of individual organisms external factors and chemical and/or physical framework conditions contribute toward the progress of the overall eco-system.

Max Planck limnologists have devised a model of cyclical changes in a "standard lake" based on international cooperation and analysis of 24 fresh water lakes in Europe, South Africa and Japan.

It consists of 24 stages outlining seasonal changes from the first algal blossom of spring to the shorter days and lower temperatures of late autumn, when phytoplankton growth comes to a halt and the lake prepares for hibernation.

This annual timetable may not strictly apply to each and every lake but it does serve as a guide, enabling lakes to be compared and individual distinctions to be drawn and deviations to be identified.

More often than not, deviations from this self-controlled cycle in lake life are due to human activity resulting in changes in nutrient composition and quantity.

Nutrient is brought to the surface in spring, absorbed by the biomass and gradually falls back into deeper water as organisms die in the course of the year.

There bacteria decompose organic substances. Nutrient is remineralised and stored in the sediment. Oxygen is used in the process, being needed to bind nutrient in the sediment.

In other words, if a lake is overfertilised by, say, the inflow of agricultural phosphates algae will grow en masse, exhausting the oxygen supply.

For lack of oxygen phosphorus, the main growth-limiting nutrient, can no longer be bound in the sediment.

This seriously upsets the natural life cycle. A single input of surplus nutrient can impose a long-term burden on the lake, which cannot dispose of the surplus from one year to the next.

Smaller, shallower lakes can be resuscitated by means of "artificial respiration." Oxygen is pumped into the deeper water, enabling free nutrient to be bound in the sediment.

Sediment can also be dredged, which similarly eases the burden of surplus nutrient on the lake's eco-system.

In larger lakes zooplankton density could, in theory, be boosted, leading to limitation of algal growth by the plankton's voracious appetite.

This can be brought about by clearing the lake of fish, which would then no longer be around to reduce the quantity of zooplankton in the water.

This crass interference with the eco-system would basically only cure a symptom, not the complaint, and at the wrong end of the stick too.

In the final analysis a lake can only be helped by calling a halt to the nutrient input from farmland or inadequately purified sewage or effluent. A lake copes best when left to its own devices — and its natural, seasonal rhythm.

Walter Frese

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 14 June 1987)

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to go to bed at some time in the evening, to fall asleep fairly soon, to sleep all night and wake up refreshed the next morning.

Sleep habits, in this case the bipolar rhythm of sleeping and waking, are laid down by society.

No-one would hit on the idea of reverting to the sleep habits of a three-month-old baby. It alone can sleep when it feels like it, Zulley and Campbell say. Yet a nap does you a power of good.

Jürgen Zulley combines theory and practice. "I may not sleep long at midday," he says, "but whatever happens I relax."

He was not available to answer further questions at the Max Planck Institute at midday. He was still unavailable when the writer phoned back at 3 p.m.

dpa

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 27 June 1987)

How the Nazis gutted talent

Continued from page 11

the first of roughly 180 "propaganda films", *Man Hunt* (1941) and *Hangmen also die* (1943), both by Fritz Lang, *Five Graves to Cairo* (1943, Billy Wilder), *Margin for Error* (1943, Otto Preminger) or *Mission to Moscow* (1943, Michael Curtiz) can be seen in a parallel film retrospective.

Another interesting aspect of the exhibition is the confirmation of the fact that producers were able to gain a foothold in Hollywood thanks to their international experience.

Despite their good reputation, on the other hand, cameramen were refused membership of the professional cameramen's association (Schüfftan, Courant).

Whereas composers of film music, such as Franz Waxmann, Friederich Hollaender or Miklós Rósza managed to find work, scriptwriters were clearly handicapped by the lack of a feeling for the English language and the American narrative drama style.

Most émigrés stayed in their countries of exile after the war.

The few who tried to continue their pre-war successes experienced a fiasco.

Despite awards Peter Lorre's film *Der Verlorene* was a flop. The past was an unpopular subject matter.

During her tour in 1960 Marlene Dietrich was not only praised she was also criticised.

These two examples show that there was no *Stunde Null* (zero hour) in 1945 or afterwards.

Josef Nagel

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 21 June 1987)

■ SOCIETY

Violence in films: are Rambo and Rocky cathartic or contagious?

Does violence in films make young people imitate it? Or does it merely transfer existing aggression to a fantasy world and prevent it from becoming reality? Reiner Scholz looks at the subject for *Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt.*

Mothers despairingly ask themselves where they went wrong. Teachers express their growing concern that their pupils might drift into the world of crime.

Within just three months 1.7 million tickets have been sold at West German cinemas for the brutal action film *City Cobra.* The film is now available at video libraries too.

Fifteen year-old Murat is well-informed about all films of this kind.

He reads all the illustrated PR leaflets put out by American film distributors, which are either published each week in the editorial section of *Bravo*, a magazine for young people, or in *Film News*, a million or more copies of which are issued every three months by a major fast-food chain.

"The beginning of the film is already pretty good," says Murat.

A pockmarked psychopath forces his way into a supermarket with a machine-gun in his hand.

The camera gives a close-up of his jackboots. Shots and cries are heard, the madman mows down everything in sight, hand-grenades explode, goods fall to the ground, bottles burst, customers die in slow motion, and the killer takes hostages.

All 48 people in the "Aladin" cinema in Hamburg, 46 men and two women, know that the time has come for Silvester Stallone, the "city cobra", to step in to sort things out.

Stallone made a name for himself in *Rambo I* and *Rambo II* as well as his *Rocky* films I - IV.

He is a veteran of the Vietnam war and usually leading actor in the films for which he generally writes the script.

"I don't like guys like you," says Stallone. "You're a disease and I'm the medicine."

This is his message to individuals or even entire societies. His "cure" in this film is to hurl a knife into the ribs of the pockmarked killer.

Tough guy Stallone is the hero of the new muscle-man brand of film which has replaced the zombie films of recent years in the popularity of cinemagoers.

There's not much thinking, talking and certainly not loving done in these films. The shooting, on the other hand, is all the better and Stallone always come out on top in any battle with a scratch mark on his face at the most.

Although this category of film is nothing new the breathtaking precision in the use of modern technology is revolutionary.

Stallone's body, which is often presented to the audience bare-chested, stands for success, the carefully dabbed-on beads of sweat for superhuman physical effort, and Stallone himself for the archetype of the species man, an American "who has a German father and a Red-Indian mother," as Murat explains.

His weapons are, what else would one expect with this kind of ancestry, his single-mindedness and tenacity, coolness, swiftness and determination, physical strength and his conviction that only people like himself can save mankind, since the world around them is no more than an absurd and intellectually watered-down facade.

"How many of you have seen *Rambo?* All the pupils in a secondary modern school in Hamburg-Barmbek raise their hands. A *frail-looking* boy by the name of Stefan beats all the records: "I've seen it eighteen times".

His fellow pupil Murat is impressed by the fact that Stallone writes his own screenplays.

"He's the cool type who goes down well with the women. After seeing *Rocky* I wanted to pack in football and take up boxing.

"When I came out the cinema I felt somehow proud. This feeling came again and again when I heard the music *Living in America* in the disco."

Would Murat behave the same way as the *city cobra?* "Sure," he answers. "I would have shot those guys too. Otherwise they get sent to some mental institution by the judge and then break loose again".

Who goes to see these films? "Almost everyone. When *Rocky* was first shown, however, the audience was full of pimps.

"We really got scared and to begin with we felt like leaving."

Do these films make you feel brutal?

"I haven't been in a brawl for four years," Murat replies, "and Taylan, who can talk about these films for hours on end, is really harmless."

Harmless or not, anyone who goes to see these films is emotionally aroused.

The Federal Inspection Office for Morally Harmful Publications (BPS) was frequently called upon to ban the videotape version of *Rambo II.*

In 1986 the film was put on their index. The BPS does not accept the argument that the film's story is overexaggerated as an "extenuating" factor.

In the film, Rambo single-handedly frees an American prisoner-of-war from the well-guarded Vietnamese jungle.

"Even the exaggerated presentation of a bloodbath ... could at least have lastingly adverse effects on young people," the BPS stated in justification of its decision.

The fact that films of this kind are as old as the history of cinema itself is countered with the argument that this is "not so much a reason for allowing similar films to be shown, but rathermore a reason for rethinking previous censorship practice."

"Effects research", a relatively new branch of media science which is often called upon to decide on the beneficial or detrimental effects of various forms of social interaction, could help out in this discussion.

Effects research was called in to help during the debate on the risks of pornographic publications in the 1960s.

The BPS refers to "sound empirical findings of the model-oriented sociopsychological theory of learning", according to which presentations of brute force have a "brutalising" effect.

"Rambo already becomes a figure with whom young boys can identify," part of the BPS line of reasoning runs, "because he acts (kills) and does not talk."

The contrary assumption is at least just as plausible, albeit less likely to hit the headlines: "Via the experience of violence in films (a person's) own violence potential is reduced, since the energy of the aggressive urge is sublimated or compensated."

According to this thesis, films showing violence have an almost "psychohygienic function" as they help "cushion aggressions within the activity context of the film without allowing them to become socially disruptive."

This definition of what is known as the catharsis theory was presented by the media scientist Michael Schumann in the teaching journal *Päd. Extra.*

The stimulation thesis, whose justification is rooted in the theory of learning, and the catharsis thesis, with its psychoanalytical background, have stood in irreconcilable conflict for many years.

Due to their respectively limited research approaches neither theory has been able to provide conclusive evidence to corroborate its claims.

In such a situation there is a growing desire to take a much more closer look at how young people in fact respond to the stimuli of visually depicted violence.

Frauke Wiegmann from the Media Department in Hamburg's Social Welfare Office advises those interested in more practical information to "go along with young people to see one of these popular films at 6 p.m. and just look and listen.

"The young people come in groups. If they get bored they leave, go to the toilet, for a smoke or somewhere else.

"If the film's not exciting enough you soon hear them shouting 'What a load of rubbish. You can't take us for a ride'".

For young people the cinema is a place to meet, a communication centre, as the work of art of squashed Coca Cola cans, empty crisp bags and crumpled plastic beakers left behind after a film has been shown which no-one was interested in shows.

Every week roughly 600,000 young people aged between 12 and 18 make their way to the 3,600 West German cinemas.

The first generation which has grown up together with the visual media is mainly interested in signals they can recognise again, "certain physical gestures, certain fashions, certain types of cars, a certain type of music (at the moment: mainstream rock), plenty of action, comedy, and surprises."

"In comparison with all these," says Frauke Wiegmann, "the story, the content or even the deeper meaning of the film is very much a background aspect."

"The general fears many adults have," says Professor Kübler, a media expert at the Hamburg College of Librarianship "that the visually perceived fantasies will be directly translated into reality and materialise in day-to-day life are not understood by the young people themselves."

Summing up his experience in this field during the annual congress of the "Youth Protection Experts for the Voluntary Self-Control of the Film Industry" a year ago, Kübler added that young people "would at least like to be regarded as clever and competent enough to distinguish between fiction and reality."

Young people, he stressed, do not establish emotional ties to their heroes, whether they're called Stallone or Schwarzenegger. These heroes do not give them an "existential orientation".

Talking about certain films and being well-informed about those which are particularly "in" enhances the ranking in the role assignment of the group, an important aspect for all young *people.*

Being able to look at *certain brutal* scenes is regarded as indicative of

DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES
SONNTAGSBLATT

"coolness, masculinity and coming to terms with the tough adult world".

This behavioural pattern, which is mainly limited to young males, changes over time. What is more, the degree of emotional detachment to the content of *these films* increases with the number of films seen.

It should also be taken into account that these youngsters have just as much fun watching nonsense films.

Police Academy and *Beverly Hills Cop*, for example, both attracted five million cinemagoers in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The world of children today is extremely socialised, the period in which the real trials and tribulations of life take their toll is postponed, and the real perception of the threat posed by unemployment, environmental catastrophe and war would only lead to nightmares.

But what about their dreams?

Cushioned by the soft comfort of wall-to-wall carpeting, wedged in between a bubbling aquarium and huge mahogany-style wall units, and exposed to the lack of language and care or the drivel of excessively educationally aware parents, young people have no option but to seek a role in their own sub-culture, where they are the only ones who really count.

The slogan "Life is Xerox. You are just a copy" sums up the essence of previous experience and is a challenge to be more than just a cheap imitation.

The most popular film among youngsters at the moment is *Top Gun,* whose professional aerial filming could fascinate any cinemagoer.

The film, which is a heroic epic about pilots, led to a ten per cent increase in the number of young men who registered for the US air force.

From a certain standpoint this is a disturbing aspect.

The question is, however, whether with regard to the film or to the social reality of the young people who opt for this career.

Reiner Scholz

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 14 June 1987)

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ture version of the city itself on a scale of 1:500. Even without the residential quarter it's still enough to get the imagination going about what it was like in those days.

In a rather innocous way one also gets a look into the world of the gods. Small "Tesserae" or small plates were made with god-like images on them. They were probably used as invitation cards for ritual meals in honour of certain gods.

The most important of the gods were the water-spring god Yarhibol (Palmyra was after all an oasis); Bel, the city god; the moon god, Aglibol; and the sun god, Malakbel.

These were represented by their symbols or with their priests on the plates.

The city placed great importance on these gods and dedicated their most important temple to them.

Ekkehard Böhm

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 20 June 1987)

■ FRONTIERS

East Germans tell about new lives in the West

DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES
SONNTAGSBLATT

"Why am I here? I'll tell you why!" Markus M., 18 years old, slammed the palm of his hand sharply on the leather-bound steering wheel of his metallic-silver car. "That's why. I couldn't have afforded that over there."

Markus now lives with his younger brother and parents in Hamburg. They were allowed to leave East Germany three years ago.

His mother, Frau M., said: "We live here happily, but I wish there weren't so many foreigners." She shrugged her shoulders.

In the meantime, 13 members of the family have made it to the West. They have all found work, say their new surroundings are friendly and have encountered no prejudice and feel they have been accepted. Their fight for freedom, as they often refer to it, was successful.

Frau M. says it is a freedom many people don't appreciate. She says many young people don't know what to do with their time, are far too self-indulgent and they vandalise.

The family is not impressed with Bonn's Ostpolitik. They say the money East Germany receives because of it is often wasted. And when they were in the West wanting material help, the church only offered them prayers.

The family applied to leave East Germany in 1977. The mother and father were jailed for a year in 1983 for "passing on information" to the Bonn government.

Then, as they describe it, they found themselves in the Giessen refugee clearance centre in West Germany where they had arrived without so much as toothbrushes "in exchange for expensive machinery". Other former prisoners were with them.

They and their children were among the about 35,000 East Germans allowed out permanently three years ago, a bumper year for exit permits. In the three years since then, another 43,000 have been allowed out.

Herr M says the imprisonment left them with shattered nerves and it took them a year to recover. "We won't forget our experience until the last political prisoner is out. Some of those who now make it out without too many problems over-rate what they have done by comparison."

There is no doubt that the East Germans now are more generous in their treatment of applicants for exit permits and many something.

Wuppertal sociology professor Ronge says: "Many East German migrants build themselves a new existence with remarkable self assurance, tenacity, self-will and with a pioneering spirit that has all but vanished in the West."

There are no statistics of how many from the East take to alcohol because of loneliness or problems in adjusting to a new way of life, who get a "no fixed abode" stamped in their papers or who land in psychiatric care. And that is not just a few.

But most adjust well. A Nuremberg institute specialising in career research and work market found in a study that 80 per cent of migrants from the East found work within six months.

They are highly motivated to get somewhere in their new world, they are stimulated by their new-found freedom and not hamstrung by inflexible and bureaucratic work practices. Many actually find that for the first time they are able to come close to socialist ideals about "fulfilling duty" and "meaningful work".

Lutz F. recalls that three years ago shortly after he had completed his *Realschule* in a village with 600 people near Karl Marx Stadt, he was "completely shocked" when he suddenly landed in the rowdy city of Hamburg.

His performance at school declined sharply until he came to the realisation that "here I am responsible for for becoming successful." He says he now feels integrated because he adjusted. He applied for 15 jobs and received five offers of apprenticeship.

Migrants from East Germany are sometimes highly critical of each other. Marlies H. is 29. She came to West Germany via a third country "only because of love", doesn't think much of some of her fellow East Germans.

Her boyfriend, she says, was for 20 years in an armed industrial militia group. "Here, he complains about the foreigners and told me that if I expect him to protect me, I should have stayed behind in East Germany."

She is a metalworker and in East Germany was a member of the SED, the East Berlin party. But only here in the West has she "for the first time really become political with Brokdorf (a controversial nuclear power plant) and so on."

She feels at ease in West Germany. She organises social events at work with the same energy as she did in East Germany at the works. But it was more friendly in the East. "Here at work you are really driven. At night you are so tired you can barely read the newspaper. And I wish the homesickness would go away." Going back is out of the question, even for visits. That is not allowed.

Ute K. is one of those to whom the word "freedom" does not mean only "getting up there as quickly as possible and making a lot of money."

The 32-year-old nursing sister has seen through the illusions. "As Maoists, we rejected the (East Berlin) party's proclaimed consumer boom and thought that in West Germany we would be better able to realise our political aims of a just, human society free from great pressures to consume."

Now that she realises that her hopes will only with great difficulty be realised, she lives with another woman from East Germany on the outskirts of Hamburg in a rented terrace house and leads a private life "the extent of which we once could hardly have imagined was possible.

"In the Federal Republic you realise you can do things that you couldn't before: finding pleasure in driving the car, finding remote spots in the country, studying. Our old aims like improving society suddenly became incid- ental. Citizens initiatives and other activities that guided our existence in the East are here suddenly petty."

However, she withdraws often into privacy because she feels people relate to each other only superficially here. Does she think people here are a commodity and therefore exchangeable?

"I have often asked myself why I have not written my experiences down," she says. "I sometimes think that it doesn't pay to be here. In East Germany you feel like a speck of dust in space. And here, you feel like a 100th part of that speck of dust."

Reiner Scholz

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 28 June 1987)

West of the Wall. Life begins again for at a refugee centre for this family from East Germany. (Photo: dpa)

Jailed Chileans create asylum dilemma for Bonn government

The Bonn government is facing a dilemma on whether to grant political asylum to 14 Chileans facing terrorist charges in Santiago. The Chilean government says they are terrorists who have committed crimes of violence including murder and bank robbery.

The 12 men and two women are members of MIR, a Chilean extreme left-wing organisation which is blamed for about half of the 280 victims of terrorism in 1986.

They say that confessions on which their charges are based have been extracted by torture. Four have already been sentenced to death but have appealed. They have been in investigative custody for years and it could take years longer before all have been sentenced.

In October last year, an organisation set up by relatives of political prisoners turned to the German government for help. In December, Bonn informed the Chilean military regime that the *Länder* of Hamburg, Bremen and Hesse (since then, Saarland has also been included) were all prepared to take the 14. However, the decision over asylum is a Federal government affair. So it is investigating the validity of the claims.

The Bonn Foreign Office hopes to check the facts of the matter including the torture charges in Chile itself. Otherwise there is little else it can do because there is little likelihood that any of the 14 will be released until they have been sentenced.

Previously, political opponents were allowed to leave. The Greens say that after 1973, the year Allende was killed, 2,158 got out. Four of them came to Hamburg.

So far the Foreign Office has made investigations through the Bonn Embassy in Santiago. Family members, lawyers and the local Roman Catholic church have been questioned.

It seems that the Chilean government has decided to use the seriousness of the charges and the accuseds' membership of MIR to justify invoking Decree 504. This decree, brought in in 1975, lays down that people jailed through the military court system can only gain exit visas by having their sentences converted to expulsion orders. People sentenced to death must first have the sentence changed to life imprisonment.

So far, the only Chilean to get out under Decree 504 was Ullyses Gomez Navarra, who last year went to Frankfurt.

The arguments for and against in Germany have deteriorated into a quarrelling bout, the only advantage of which has been once more to focus public awareness on what is happening in Chile.

Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann, who opposes granting asylum, points out that even social-liberal governments in Germany have rejected political asylum applications from Chileans.

He quotes from an agreement in March 1975 when all West German interior ministers agreed on guidelines for accepting refugees from Chile (they also now apply to Argentinians as well).

This lays down that "criminals and politically violent" people should be rejected.

So should applicants where there "are grounds for believing that they have taken part or committed brutal political crimes."

Zimmermann also refers to the case of the Chilean Cargagena Cordova who sought asylum in West Germany after being sentenced to jail in 1976.

He received asylum, went to live in Göttingen and later returned to Chile via Czechoslovakia and Cuba.

Back in Chile, he now faces the courts again — on three charges of bank robbery and two of murder. A policeman and a watchman were killed during the robberies.

Dieter Putz

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